Lebanon's Ethno-Sectarian Divide in Light of the Israel-Lebanon War

Anti-government protesters clash with riot policemen during a protest against government’s plans to impose new taxes

Religious conflict has historically been at the forefront of endless domestic disputes, driving  civilians to question their national identity and challenging social cohesion. Within modern political divisions, religion has become part of a wider conversation of representation, with individuals drawing on their religious identity as a means of asserting social values and political influence. Weaponizing religion to push ideological agendas is a potent force in divisive societies, with Lebanon serving as a stark example. Lebanon, a country where over a dozen officially recognized religious sects coexist, operates under a delicate and historically rooted power-sharing system designed to balance its intricate sectarian diversity. In 1932, undee the French Mandate, a census revealed that Christians, mostly Maronites, accounted for 60% of the population, with Muslims, who were majority Sunni and minority Shia, representing 40%. Political power was therefore distributed based on this demographic ratio in 1943 by allocating Maronite Christians the Presidency, Sunni’s with the premiership and Shiite’s with the Speaker of the Parliament. After the outbreak of the Lebanese Civil War in 1975 which stemmed from sectarian clashes over the Palestinian cause, a necessary reassessment of the sectarian system was proposed. Utilizing the 1943 National Pact as a foundational model, the 1989 Taif Agreement was enacted which revised the confessional system by accommodating to Muslims. While the role of presidency remained entitled to the Maronites, the authority of the president was diminished. In turn, the roles of the Sunni prime minister and the Shiite speaker of Parliament gained more significance and power, and the ratio of Christian to Muslim seats in parliament was shifted to 1:1.

However, the influx of over 500,000 Palestinian refugees since 1967 and approximately 1.5 million Syrian refugees since 2011 has significantly altered Lebanon’s demographic makeup, further skewing the existing religious divide and intensifying sectarian tensions. These predominantly Sunni refugee populations have exacerbated fears of a demographic imbalance, challenging the fragile power-sharing system and contributing to political instability​.  Following recent economic crises and the 2020 Beirut Port explosion, the emigration of over 200,000 majority Christian-Lebanese citizens has exposed areas of insufficiency in the Taif Agreement. A reversal from the earlier dominance of Maronite Christians, Muslims are now estimated to make up 60% of the population, a change driven largely by emigration and simultaneous waves of immigration. Within the majority Muslim population, it is estimated that more than half of the Muslim makeup consists of Shiites. 

What remains central to the broader conversation on religious division are the underlying roots of sectarian conflict. Barack Obama, for instance, has echoed the “ancient sectarian differences” as a means of explaining current conflicts. Similar notions place emphasis on colonial influence over sectarian divides, dating to early 20th century politics. However the failure to address political authoritarianism as part of the sectarian ‘problem’ across regimes in the Middle East inhibits meaningful reform. Thus while it is true that religious identities are principal within Lebanese state politics, these identities have been intentionally weaponized and politicised by sects in pursuit of political gain. In competition for lucrative government departments, sects instigate conflict amongst each other, undermining any efforts to establish a cohesive national identity. In Lebanon, sectarian divides have manifested into a system of de facto geographical sovereignty, as political allegiances rooted in religious identities began asserting control over specific territories across the region. The South of Lebanon is largely Shiite-dominated, where groups like Hezbollah wield considerable influence. In Mount Lebanon, Christian communities maintain a stronghold, preserving political and cultural authority. Meanwhile, the far North is predominantly Sunni. The established territorial divisions across the nation have increasingly fragmented national and social cohesion, creating a system where each sect exercises a form of sovereignty over its respective region. 

In this fractured political landscape, the arrival of large displaced populations, including Syrians and Palestinians, has exposed Lebanon’s absence of social cohesion, challenging the country’s ability to respond to humanitarian crises. The Syrian civil war brought a mass wave of displacement, with 1.5 million Syrians seeking refuge in Lebanon. Syrians were subject to policies aimed at limiting integration, such as the prohibition of formal refugee camps and restrictive residency regulations. Many Syrians live in precarious conditions, facing barriers to employment, healthcare, education​, emigration and demographic shifts.The geographic distribution of displaced Syrians is a critical factor, with the majority settled in the Bekaa region. As of January 1 2023, the total number of Syrian refugees in the Beeka region was 318,713. As the economic crisis in Lebanon deteriorated, and more recently the intensification of conflict between Hezbollah and Israel, anti-refugee sentiment has exacerbated. Beyond Beeka, an abundance of Syrian refugees have integrated into many of Lebanon’s hubs, especially Beiriut. The influx of predominantly Sunni refugees, whether they be isolated within the Beeka region or integrated in significant Lebanese cities, is perceived as a threat to the already fragile demographic composition. This perception has fueled debates on whether to integrate or exclude refugees, with concerns that their permanent settlement could disrupt Lebanon's fragile sectarian equilibrium. This in turn has exacerbated the displacement crisis as the government has failed to establish a coherent vetting system for Syrian refugees for fear of political upheaval.  

The crisis of Palestinian refugees takes similar precedence, as of 1967 Lebanese governments officially and consistently refused to integrate refugees. This rejection of permanent settlement has led Lebanon's government to oppose all policies and actions that could be construed as facilitating or accepting Palestinian integration. Within the dissent over Palestinian rights, the majority of refugees have frequently been scapegoated for domestic instability, especially by right-wing, Maronite-Lebanese factions who also attributed their presence to exacerbating the 17-year civil war and contributing to the collapse of the state. The 1975 civil war in particular marked the integration of Hezbollah into Lebanese politics, as the group gained traction after their successful campaign against Israel. However, it intensified the divisive discourse over Lebanon’s involvement in the Palestinian challenge of self-determination, while also shifting the sectarian balance to increase Shiite representation. As of 1992, Hezbollah has maintained influence within the Lebanese government and manages a vast network of social services. However, despite their political strongholds, many Lebanese citizens, particularly from the Sunni and Christian factions, oppose the group and their influence on national affairs. Discontent deepened when Hezbollah's hostility towards Israel following Hamas’ October 7th attacks drew Lebanon into a two-month conflict, exacerbating the country's economic and political crises. Many view Hezbollah's ties to Iranian-backed Shiite groups as a dangerous entanglement that undermines Lebanon's stability and accelerates the collapse of a state already crippled by corruption, economic ruin, and political paralysis.

Displacement has disproportionately impacted already vulnerable regions like Tyre in southwestern Lebanon, along with Nabatieh and Saida, alongside the Syrian border, which are areas long neglected by the central government. Many displaced families are now living in overcrowded shelters with deteriorating conditions and limited access to basic necessities such as clean water, medical care, and sanitation. Syrian and Palestinian refugees, who were already living in precarious circumstances, face heightened insecurity, with limited options for refuge and a rising anti-refugee sentiment. The Lebanese government's “hands off” approach stems not only from its inability to establish a coherent system, but also from a longstanding perception of Palestinians as a threat to state security. This policy has led to the ghettoization of refugee camps, isolated enclaves segregated from Lebanese society, deepening mistrust and perpetuating instability. Public services, already paralyzed by political deadlock and underfunding, have been unable to provide effective humanitarian aid. While international organizations like UNRWA and UNICEF have mobilized to provide emergency relief, their efforts are hampered by funding shortages and logistical challenges, leaving significant gaps in aid delivery. This multifaceted humanitarian crisis has uncovered the faults within Lebanon’s intricate sectarian landscape, which is unable - or perhaps in some cases, unwilling - to formulate coherent policies towards the integration and management of displaced individuals. 

Recent escalations in the Middle East uncovered the ticking time-bomb amongst rival ethno-sectarian forces, pushing the region closer to widespread conflict. This volatility, along with the influence of foreign interventions, had fueled the emergence of collapsed states characterized by corruption. This fragility is exemplified by the recent fall of Bashar Al Assad’s regime as of 8 December 2024. However, the regime’s collapse marks a new chapter for Lebanon, offering opposition forces a chance to challenge Hezbollah's dominance. Assad’s Syria played a key role in Hezbollah's arms trade - his escape to Russia has provoked politicians to call for the militia group to surrender their weapons. Given the hopes of increased stability in Syria following the collapse of Assad’s regime, many in Lebanon are calling for displaced Syrians to return to their nation. Moving forward, the ongoing developments in the Middle East have sparked discourse on Lebanon’s urgent need to focus inwardly. This includes revising current policies on integration and prioritising national reconstruction to address internal challenges and restore stability. Lebanon must now shift its attention toward rebuilding its social, political, and economic foundations to ensure a more cohesive and resilient future.