By Begoña Arechalde
On October 23, the UN body supervising the peaceful resolution of Libya’s Civil War, UNSMIL, announced that the warring factions, the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) and the rebel-led National Liberation Army (NLA), have reached a ceasefire agreement.
The agreement gives a truce to the poverty-stricken North African country, at war since the ousting of Muammar Qaddafi in 2011 in a coup orchestrated by NATO and led by the governments of Barack Obama and Nicolas Sarkozy.
Following the coup, Qaddafi's sovereignty disintegrated and fell into the hands of multiple local militias and new players, including the Islamic State. Among these groups, GNA and the NLA prevailed. Today, the GNA occupies western Libya and the capital Tripoli, while supporters of the NLA have settled in the east where they control most of the country's oil reserves.
On the plus side, the ceasefire document published by UNSMIL emphasises the need to reincorporate the different militias into state institutions. GNA and NLA delegates, united under the name of Joint Military Commission (JMC), have agreed to establish a three-month truce in which all militias will be identified and withdrawn to be replaced by police forces. The police will also be deployed along the three main roads of the country to ensure the arrival of humanitarian aid and the safe transit of Libyan citizens.
Whilst this accord marks significant progress for peace-building in Libya, its measures are vague and may well prove insufficient to create a lasting peace. The UN must expand on the clauses and ensure their correct implementation so that internal disputes and the interests of third parties - particularly those of Turkey and Russia - do not jeopardize recent progress.
Vague prescriptions around preventing foreign intervention included in the ceasefire agreement are a case in point. Although the measure is much needed to guarantee the sovereignty of a new national government, UNSMIL has not provided steps for doing so. The JMC will certainly struggle to diminish the influence of foreign actors, who during the war have turned Libya into an arena to promote their economic, energy and geopolitical interests.
The GNA has the support of the UN, Qatar, the EU, and Turkey, while NLA's main allies are Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, Russia, and surprisingly, albeit unofficially, France. Until now, the United States has remained neutral although it has geopolitical interests in Egypt and its main ally in the region, Israel, has been secretly supplying the NLA with security systems and weapons.
Multiple motivations underpin Turkey's support for the GNA. Turkey holds $16 billion in frozen contracts in Libya and has engaged in multiple bilateral trade agreements across the continent. The Turkish government has also sent soldiers in exchange for gas exploration rights in the south of the country which they are unlikely to relinquish without significant pressure.
Meanwhile, France is moving away from the European Union’s pro-GNA position to ensure its economic and military interests in the Maghreb and sub-Saharan territory. By supporting the NLA, Paris aims to rekindle the decimated relationship with its former colonies Chad, Niger, Mali and Burkina-Faso, and establish new economic ties.
Russia also wants a piece of the pie. Its intervention in Libya is motivated by the desire to establish military bases on the southern flank of Europe, secure oil and construction contracts in Libya, and wage a proxy war with Turkey. Moscow has sent Russian soldiers to fight with the NLA forces and has allowed the private military contractor Wagner Group to sell weapons and mercenaries to eastern Libya.
While these powers have all publicly celebrated the agreement while they have not announced the cessation of their operations in Libya or their intention to do so in the near future.
Furthermore, while the pact demands the withdrawal of non-Libyan soldiers and mercenaries, it fails to provide guidelines on how to expel them from the country. It also seems to assume that foreign forces will not offer resistance. The influence of Turkey and Russia in Libya is primarily militaristic and they could use their already entrenched power to manipulate the actions of the JMC. Hence, Libya's temporary government faces a daunting task with high chances of collapse due to weak institutions, wartime corruption, and internal disputes.
Not only do the vague measures of the ceasefire diminish the chaces of lasting peace, but the war has also had a negative impact on the security of other African border states. Regional instability could be triggered easily in future stages of the truce as could underlying tensions between the GNA and the NLA.
Since the 1990 Libya has transformed from being a net recipient of migrants to a country with high emigrantion rates. Ethnic conflicts are widespread and regional leaders have securitised immigration based on their personal goals. Numerous armed groups, smugglers and terrorist groups have settled along the borders with Libya, contributing to the deterioration of human rights in the region. If left unsupervised, all of this could reinforce radicalism and create local outbreaks of violence that are likely to escalate again into civil war.
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