Not the End of “The Line”? Saudi Vision 2030 and the Quest to Maintain Legitimacy

Saudi Arabian Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman

Saudi Arabia is in the media’s spotlight again. The kingdom has just won the bid to host the 2034 FIFA World Cup, although winning is a strong word considering the lack of competition to their bid, as no other country applied to host the prestigious tournament. While the effort to host the world’s most popular sports event reflects Saudi Arabia’s global ambitions as an emerging cultural power, it does come with controversy. Leading up to the announcement of the winning bid, an ITV documentary titled “Kingdom Uncovered” found that since the 2016-launch of Saudi Vision 2030, more than twenty-thousand migrant workers have died in the Gulf state. This is especially concerning considering FIFA’s obligations towards future hosts to respect “internationally recognized human rights”, which were implemented in light of controversy surrounding the 2022 Qatar World Cup. As a result, the association ordered a private firm to inspect the human rights situation in Saudi Arabia, which no reason not to deem the kingdom legitimate bidder for the megaevent. Crucially, the private firm hired by the FIFA, AS&H Clifford Chance, has ties to the Saudi government and business sector, making the association’s decision appear far from unbiased.

While the Saudi plans to host the World Cup can rightfully be considered a case of sportswashing and showcase a desire for global image transformation, the underlying objectives behind it are driven by the ruler’s realisation that a renegotiation of the kingdom’s social contract is inevitable. Saudi Arabia is a rentier state, in which the regime’s legitimacy is largely derived from its ability to allocate resources to its people. The government’s capacity to do so relies heavily on the revenues generated by its oil industry. However, this model is not only vulnerable to fluctuating oil prices but is unsustainable given its reliance upon a finite resource. 

For this reason, Saudi Arabia seeks to diversify its economy away from oil, as manifested in the launch of Saudi Vision 2030. According to its official website, the vision’s three key pillars consist of a “vibrant society”, an “ambitious nation” and a “thriving economy”. Financed by a $778 billion sovereign wealth fund, which was obtained through the privatization of state-owned oil company Aramco, the vision is best known for its ambitious construction project plans. These include “The Line”, a one-hundred-mile-long-, two-hundred-metre-wide-, and five-hundred-metre-high linear city, which is envisioned to be home to nine million people and features a football arena three-hundred metres above ground for the upcoming World Cup. 

Central to economic diversification in Saudi Arabia is the emergence of a strong private sector. As of 2017, more than twice as many jobs in the kingdom were in the public sector than in the private sector. Encouraging the expansion of private sector activity would reduce the government’s dependence on oil production as the country’s main source of revenue. Historically, the Saudi regime has been aware of the political power that the provision of economic benefits has: a key reason why the Saudi monarchy remained relatively stable during the stark political upheaval of the 2011 Arab Spring was the kingdom`s 25% increase in public spending. This exemplifies the rulers’ reliance on employing revenues to pacify their constituents. Thus, the maintenance of the legitimacy of Al-Saud rule is heavily dependent on finding sustainable, long-term solutions to keep its population economically satisfied. 

However, to establish a strong private sector and realize its ambitious construction projects, Saudi Arabia relies on foreign investment. Hence, it seeks to transform its global image to attract investors and tourists. This is challenged by negative publicity, as Saudi Arabia is facing critique for its intervention in Yemen’s civil war, as well as for its ongoing human rights violations. The murder of journalist Jamal Khashoggi is an indicative example but one of many. Saudi efforts to reconstruct their global image shift focus away from human rights concerns, presenting the kingdom as a more attractive place to do business and therefore stimulating private sector growth. 

Here, Vision 2030 is central to the kingdom’s pursuit of cultural power. Its launch in 2016 is considered successful in directing international attention away from Saudi involvement in the war in Yemen and towards visionary construction projects planned by world-famous architecture firms such as OMA and Zaha Hadid Architects. Saudi Arabia is spending billions to appear progressive to the world, inviting female icons such as singer Alicia Keys for performances and signing football superstar Cristiano Ronaldo, arguably the most famous person on the planet, to the national football league. Hosting the 2034 FIFA World Cup is the newest addition to this rebranding strategy, which Quinn Slobodian dubs a “tsunami of soft power”. 

The ambitious project itself, however, is subject to critique, mainly concerning migrant labour rights. Thus, the migrant worker death tolls detailed in “Kingdom Uncovered”, as well as reports of the forced removal of the native Huwaitat tribe from the area in which NEOM, The Line’s mother project, is supposed to be constructed, are putting Saudi Arabia’s progressive transformation in question. Acknowledging this, the scrutiny that will come as the world looks at Saudi Arabia to host the World Cup could be an opportunity for the kingdom to clear its image, but could similarly shift global attention to its violations of migrant labour and human rights. 

Still, so far Saudi Vision 2030 has to an extent succeeded in attracting foreign investment and tourism. Over the last five years, Saudi Arabia has improved nine ranks in the WEF’s Travel and Tourism Development Index, seeing the biggest increase in score out of any of the fifty highest-ranking countries. Moreover, the kingdom is experiencing an increase in non-oil exports, reflecting the results of its effort to diversify its economy. 

The regime’s attempts to appear progressive not only help to attract foreign investment but serve as a response to shifting social sentiments among Saudi Arabia’s largely young population. Hence, in pursuing sources of legitimacy alternative to oil revenue distribution, the Al-Saud rulers increasingly rely on reforms of social freedoms. The emerging access to concerts, sports and cinema changes the domestic cultural landscape and offers new entertainment opportunities for Saudi Arabia’s population. These reforms reflect Mohammed bin Salman’s recognition of young Saudis’ wishes for more freedoms, which is essential given that 63% of its population are under 30 years of age. Similarly, new reforms allow women to drive, work and travel abroad. However, this contrasts with reports about increasing surveillance and arbitrary arrests in the country. It is therefore debated whether the progressive reforms are merely a farce designed to conceal the authoritarian nature of the political system. 

The renegotiation of Saudi Arabia’s social contract further entails increasing government promotion of security and nationalism. This is the ruler’s attempt to transform the source of their legitimacy by reimagining the state as the provider of protection and identity, rather than of economic benefits. The emerging entertainment sector, especially sports events, contribute to the strengthening of national identity. The ruler’s emphasis on this is reflected in reports about the Crown Prince gifting each Saudi men’s national football team player a Rolls-Royce car and declaring a three-day national holiday after their World Cup win over Argentina in 2022. Despite that, strengthening national identity and reform are difficult to accommodate, especially given the religious foundations of Saudi nationalism. 

Al-Saud rule in the kingdom is historically based on a state-cleric alliance, in which Wahhabi religious leaders legitimised the government in return for influence over education and rule of law. This has in the past offered social control and religious stability. Under Mohammed bin Salman however, the clerics’ power has been limited, and the rule of law has departed from Quranic principles. This can be considered the Crown Prince’s reaction to the fact that the majority of young Saudi’s do not consider the grand mufti, Saudi Arabia’s leading cleric, a legitimate religious leader. On the contrary, it could also be considered the Prince’s attempt to increase his own power by limiting the influence of other voices in the kingdom. 

Reducing the role of religious leaders bears risks, as conservatives in Saudi Arabia have previously been criticizing the ruling house’s lack of religious purity. Thus, limiting religious influence undermines the state-cleric alliance, a core source of legitimacy for the Al-Saud’s. This is further enhanced by the cultural Westernization of the kingdom, which is likely to be opposed by many on the conservative side. However, given the high number of young people in Saudi Arabia, this might be a gamble that pays off in the long run. 

In sum, the Saudi government’s new strategy risks magnifying polarisation amongst varying strata of society. Recent policy shifts by the Prince signify an adaptation to developing domestic and international socio-economic environments, yet will by no means be met with open arms from all parties. This leads back to the rentier state: As alternative sources of legitimacy do not appear sustainable, and oil revenues have an expiry date, the Saudi government will increasingly rely on a diversified economy to maintain its role. Therefore, attracting investors and establishing a strong private sector while navigating through internal religious and social divides is essential for the survival of the House of Saud.