By Balint Umos
In 2019, China launched a new polar research vessel. The Xue Long 2 was the first such domestically built icebreaker and the state media at the time called it the embodiment of China’s ambitions in the Arctic. The highly manoeuvrable and modern vessel added weight to the growing Chinese interests in the region and credibility to a strategy that was lagging in implementation.
There are many reasons why China is paying more attention to the Arctic. Significant changes are occurring in the region as a result of climate change. On the one hand, the thawing of the icecap provides new capabilities for climate and environmental research. The Polar Research Institute of China, among other things, hopes to deepen understanding of weather patterns and air pollution by conducting research surveys in the region. On the other hand, China hopes to exploit the emergent natural resource potential of the Arctic, including fishing, hydrocarbons and minerals that are becoming accessible due to the melting icecap. One such resource is liquefied natural gas (LNG), which the region is believed to be abundant in. Another considerable area of interest is alternative shipping routes. The Northern Sea Route that runs along Russia’s northern coast has long been considered a hazardous passage, with the line being open only for a short window in the summer. However, as this window expands, its wider use would drastically shorten shipping routes from China to the Atlantic, shaving off thousands of kilometres from the journey.
The increasing Chinese involvement in the Arctic has been espoused by President Xi Jinping in 2014 when he declared in a speech that he wanted China to become a ‘polar great power’. Since then, the country has been increasing its presence in the region by establishing research stations and providing major investments in mining and energy. In 2018, China published its first policy document that outlined its strategy for the Arctic. This white paper identified China as a ‘near-Arctic state’ and sought to justify its ambitions for the region by referring to research and the challenges of climate change, but for the first time, also extended Beijing’s involvement to a range of commercial activities. The intended culmination of these activities is a ‘Polar Silk Road’, connecting economic centres of North America, Western Europe and East Asia. This idea is closely linked to President Xi’s Belt and Road Initiative, a strategy that constructs infrastructure and promotes links between continents, meanwhile advancing Chinese interests.
The white paper also stresses China’s commitment to upholding the institutional framework of Arctic governance. Since 2013 China has been an observer in the Arctic Council, an intergovernmental forum of coordination between the Arctic States. Under President Xi, China has made great efforts to increase its bilateral relations with the Arctic States and to enhance its multilateral cooperation in the Arctic Council. As most of the region is located within the exclusive economic zone of the Arctic States, an area where they have special rights for exploitation, cooperation is essential. Unlike these states, China has no sovereign rights to any resource extraction or fishing, with Chinese research and logistics stations also being in Norwegian, Swedish, or Icelandic territory. Furthermore, close relations with Russia are of particular importance, as the entire Northern Sea Route lies within Russia's exclusive economic zone.
However, is China’s approach to Arctic governance a status quo or a revisionist approach? A policy briefing by the European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS) suggests that while China’s Arctic policy paper emphasises upholding the legal and institutional frameworks of Arctic governance, in practice, Chinese diplomatic efforts are seeking to internationalise these regional arrangements to better accommodate Chinese interests.
What is erringly omitted from the Chinese white paper on the Arctic are national security dimensions, a significant driver of China’s ambitions in the region. A recent report by Brookings, a think tank, has found that while documents of the Chinese government intended for foreign audiences frequently emphasise the Arctic as a ‘new frontier’ or a ‘global public space’, internal publications make it quite apparent that these are regarded as domains of geopolitical rivalry. Military texts do not shy away from promoting geopolitical ambitions and do not rule out the use of force in a coming scramble for spheres of influence. Meanwhile, Chinese scholars and diplomats suggest that controlling the region is vital for obtaining dominance over the Northern Hemisphere.
The Russian invasion of Ukraine seems to have magnified this geopolitical competition. The collapse of previous regional cooperation has given way to antagonism, with sanctions imposed on Russia, and the members of the Arctic Council barring it from the organisation. Even before the invasion, Russia has been actively remilitarizing the region by constructing more than 400 military bases along its northern border. With NATO conducting its largest Arctic military exercise in decades during March, and Sweden and Finland set on joining the alliance, cooperation couldn’t be further away.
Russia placed China in a very difficult position. On the one hand, the invasion destabilises China’s existing plans for gaining more influence in the region. The internationalisation of its governance structure as intended by China is no longer a credible future trajectory. On the other hand, the significance of Sino-Russian ties in the region became even more crucial. Prior to the invasion, Russia and China have been pushing for enhanced ties, with President Xi declaring that the ‘friendship between the two states has no limits’. As the western sanctions are becoming more detrimental to its economy, Russia is becoming more reliant on China’s initiatives to make up for lost revenue. Sino-Russian cooperation in the Arctic thus seems to be heading towards a regional strategic partnership, with China being the one to gain the most.
The international cooperation that characterised the region seems to have ended and an era of competition is dawning. However, in October 2022, China’s icebreakers did not sail to the Arctic. After returning from an Antarctic expedition, they departed once again on a long-term mission to the southern side of the globe. A scramble for the Arctic may be looming, but it is not here yet.
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