By Aleksandra Kuczynska
The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) was formed by the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, and Oman in 1981 as a security community. The purpose of the organisation was ostensibly to create a common regional ‘Gulf’ identity and to serve as a strategic counter-balance to rising Arab nationalism and political Islam. Despite initial aspirations of a regional bloc in the 1980s, the GCC has seen only modest cooperation in the economic and military spheres. Post-Gulf War, this trend largely reverted to statism, leaving the GCC as a mere symbolic expression of solidarity. Indeed, one of the most salient outcomes of its establishment can be traced to the emergent regional ‘Gulf’ identity among the populations of these states. The citizens of the Gulf perceive themselves as sharing common socio-historical identities and interests, and refer to themselves as ‘Khaliji’ (literally translating to ‘residents of the Gulf’), revealing a deepened and sustained mutual social identification.
An understanding of the GCC as marked by a limited material cooperation on the one hand and a deepened symbolic Gulf identity on the other resonates with the events of the 41st GCC summit in Saudi Arabia in January 2021. After three and a half years of economic blockade imposed on Qatar by Saudi Arabia, UAE, Bahrain, and Egypt, the countries are attempting to mend the strained relations. The restoration of ties with Qatar was marked by symbolic declarations of goodwill and solidarity. Upon arrival, the Emir of Qatar Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al-Thani was personally welcomed by Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS). Walking down from the plane, named ‘Ushaiger’ after a Saudi town and an ancestral home to the Al-Thani family, Sheikh Tamim placed his hand on his heart as he approached MBS, who immediately pulled him into a warm embrace. The official statement of the GCC summit, named in honour of the two recently deceased and highly esteemed figures of regional politics, Sheikh Sabah of Kuwait and Sultan Qaboos bin Said of Oman, professed a new “bright page of brotherly relations” and promised a commitment to “solidarity and stability” in future GCC relations.
Nonetheless, this symbolic reconciliation must be understood in light of inter-state realpolitik. One must interrogate the causes and implications of this groundbreaking event. Why has the reunion occurred at this particular point in time, despite previous failed attempts at reconciliation? An examination at the national and international levels is necessary to better understand and disentangle the various regional mechanisms at play.
A Bilateral Detente
King Salman of Saudi Arabia, in preparation to pass on the mantle to his son MBS as king in the near future, sought to burnish his son’s status and prestige as a regional mediator, as well as pave the way for a Saudi foreign policy that is more independent from the UAE. This transpires from the recently worsening inter-state relations between Saudi Arabia and the UAE. In the past, these two powerhouses have worked together in pursuit of common security interests: forming bilateral political and military coalitions against internal security threats; allying on the interventions in Bahrain, Libya and Yemen; and instigating the blockade on Qatar. However, the UAE’s pursuit of self-interested foreign policy and rising hegemonic competition between the two states has increasingly challenged Saudi interests in the region. The UAE’s abandonment of the Arab Peace Initiative, the unilateral normalisation of relations with Israel, and withdrawal of support for the conflict in Yemen point to this tension.
The restoration of ties with Qatar may therefore be viewed as a bilateral reconciliation between Saudi Arabia and Qatar rather than a regional unification. Indeed, the UAE, Bahrain and Egypt did not seem to express equal enthusiasm for the repairing of ties, though all have complied. Neither Bahrain nor Egypt sent representatives to the summit. A continued maritime dispute with Qatar explains King Hamad of Bahrain’s reluctance to attend, while President of Egypt al-Sisi’s absence, though not as grievous since he is not a member of the GCC, shows a continuous unwillingness toward normalising relations. Thus, the reconciliation reflects Saudi Arabia’s strive toward regional hegemony.
The Global Stage
This attempt to strengthen the Saudi position and restore GCC unity can be yet better understood in the context of international politics. It is no accident that the normalisation of relations with Qatar came at the outset of the Biden administration. Saudi Arabia has garnered a poor reputation within the international community in recent years. The prolonged, disastrous war in Yemen, various human rights abuses, and the assassination of the Washington Post’s Jamal Khashogg have all shined a bad light on the future king, Mohammed bin Salman. His greatest benefactor and supporter abroad, Donald Trump, is no longer at disposal to shield the Crown Prince from international criticism.
The move toward unifying and strengthening Gulf relations is thus an attempt to ameliorate Saudi Arabia’s image and retain a seat at the table of international diplomacy. In particular, the GCC must present a united front due to the potential restoration of JCPOA talks between Iran and the Biden administration. The Islamic Republic of Iran has become a regional rival to the Saudi hegemonic project, and has triumphed in several regional conflicts, at the expense of Saudi Arabia’s interests. The GCC members have voiced complaints about being excluded from the past negotiations in 2015. Hence, Saudi Arabia hopes to be a partner in the new talks on Iran’s nuclear deal, and surveil its developments. Importantly, Qatar continues to maintain friendly relations with the Islamic Republic, and could serve as a mediator for greater regional dialogue.
Self-interest and mistrust among the Gulf states has been present from the beginnings of the GCC, parallel to symbolic declarations of a shared vision and common identity. What distinguished this now concluded economic blockade from the previous string of quid pro quo politics characteristic of the Gulf is that this time it had gone beyond the political confines of inter-state competition. The crisis separated families and friends for over three years and unleashed bitter smearing and finger-pointing on social media, profoundly impacting the social sphere and threatening the collective ‘Khaliji’ identity. Symbolic images of a restored friendship between the GCC leaders witnessed during the 41st summit may not be enough to heal these social antagonisms. While the reconciliation with Qatar was surely a historic moment, the jury is still out on whether the lifting of the blockade and profession of solidarity will mend the rift within the GCC.
Comments