Trump's reelection and what it means for the Middle East

In early November 2024, following Donald Trump’s reelection as U.S. President, Qatar expelled Hamas leaders from Doha, effectively closing the group's political headquarters amid apparent fears of retribution from the incoming administration. While longstanding diplomatic pressure on Qatar to distance itself from Hamas should not be overlooked—particularly after a year of failed mediation efforts in Israel-Hamas ceasefire negotiations—Trump's reelection seemingly forced Qatar's hand, precipitating Hamas’s departure and signaling broader regional shifts to come.

Trump's “madman theory” of foreign policy—an approach reminiscent of President Richard Nixon’s Cold War strategy against the Communist Bloc—has left various actors in the Middle East uneasy. By projecting unpredictability and a readiness for extreme, even irrational, actions, a leader may gain leverage in international bargaining so suggests the theory. Whether by calculated design or inherent temperament, President-elect Trump embodies this archetype, which is why the mere prospect of his presidency appeared to frighten Qatar into ceasing its harboring of Hamas—a stark contrast to the Biden administration’s more measured approach.

The question now is whether Trump’s madman foreign policy in the Middle East will translate into sustained strategic successes or whether short-term power politics will unravel into long-term instability for the region.

As was the case during his first term, Trump is taking a hardline approach toward America’s adversaries in the Middle East, such as Iran and Hamas, centered on unconditional support for Israel. On December 2, 2024, Trump stated on his Truth Social platform, “If the hostages are not released prior to January 20, 2025, the date that I proudly assume Office as President of the United States, there will be ALL HELL TO PAY in the Middle East, and for those in charge who perpetrated these atrocities against Humanity.”

He added specificity to this threat by continuing, “Those responsible will be hit harder than anybody has been hit in the long and storied History of the United States of America. RELEASE THE HOSTAGES NOW!”

Hamas spokesperson Basem Naim responded by blaming Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu for spoiling a UNSC-backed deal in early July that would have “included a full prisoners’ exchange,” delusionally, if not sardonically, reinterpreting Trump’s message to imply that it was “actually directed first towards Netanyahu and his government.”

Regardless of one’s opinion on the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian conflict, it is obviously evident that it is Hamas, not Israel, in Trump’s crosshairs. Netanyahu praised Trump for acknowledging “the responsibility of Hamas,” reiterating Trump’s call for Hamas to release the remaining hostages—around 100, seven of which are U.S. citizens—held captive in Gaza.

It is no wonder, then, that Hamas’s flippancy only comes as its leadership now regroups in Turkey, a NATO member, that, unlike Qatar, is more insulated from severe actions by the U.S., even after Trump—who at previous times has expressed admiration for Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan—assumes office. Clearly, Erdoğan thinks he can play to Trump’s vanity and transactional nature, indicating that Trump “had very nice things to say about Turkey regarding the period ahead” on a November 6, 2024, call (which also involved Elon Musk, who was appointed by Trump to lead the new Department of Government Efficiency). 

Musk—a key figure in Trump’s administration—also met with Iran's Ambassador to the U.N., Amir Saeid Iravani, to discuss easing U.S.-Iran tensions. Although Iran's Foreign Ministry denied the meeting, lacking official diplomatic ties to the U.S, the supposed outreach indicates that Iran may be interested in improving relations with the incoming U.S. administration, at the very least avoiding provocations given Trump’s unpredictability, wholesale backing of Isreal (who has its sights on Iran’s nuclear and military facilities for backing Hamas), and historical willingness to assassinate Iranian leaders like Qasem Soleimani irrespective of internation law.

These factors may also explain, in part, why Iran decided to abstain from intervening during the Turkish-backed rebel offensive in Syria, which culminated in President Bashar al-Assad fleeing and the fall of Damascus over the weekend (December 6-8, 2024). By refraining from military intervention in Syria, Iran likely sought to prevent actions that could jeopardize potential diplomatic openings with the U.S., especially considering Trump's position of nationalistic non-intervention in the Syrian civil war, hardline stance on Iran, and constantly looming threat of sanctions.

The rapid advancement of opposition forces in Syria and the lack of intervention from Russia, another key Assad ally, were also factors that likely contributed to Iran reassessing its position in Syria, as the changing dynamics on the ground coupled with economic constraints and regional overextension made resistance untenable for both Iran and Russia. Russian President Vladimir Putin is particularly overextended, currently throwing all his military resources at Ukraine in hopes of gaining as much territory as possible before new borders are drawn based on a peace proposal from retired Army Lieutenant-General Keith Kellogg —Trump’s incoming Russia-Ukraine envoy.

Trump's previous decisions, including the withdrawal of U.S. troops from parts of northern Syria, have accommodated Turkey's interests, which has emboldened Erdoğan both in Syria and, as abovementioned, with hosting Hamas. Meanwhile, even in opposition to Israel, Turkey has maintained restraint in their support of Hezbollah, as the dismantling of the Shia militant group is perceived as beneficial, potentially enhancing Turkey's (and Sunni) regional influence vis-à-vis Iran. This Sunni-Shia divide also explains why Turkey is more willing to risk U.S. reprisals over their support of Hamas, a Sunni militant group—which is only backed by Iran for its shared opposition to Israel.

Despite the recent U.S. and France-brokered ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah in Lebanon, Iran could not commit to Assad as evidence mounts that their Lebanese proxy is far from down and out. Both Hezbollah and Israel have violated the ceasefire in southern Lebanon, and some contend that a fourth Lebanon war is around the corner, requiring that Iran be prepared to protect their Shia interests. The Biden administration pushed for the ceasefire deal, but it may very well have been the incoming Trump administration’s hardline posturing, as with Hamas, that sealed it. Under the guise of a ceasefire, the two sides will continue to militarily engage without extreme escalation, thereby lessening the demand for U.S. involvement—at least until an incendiary event reignites full-scale conflict.

All of these unfolding regional sectarian and power dynamics are representative of Trump’s overarching approach to the Middle East. At the heart of his strategy is the objective of expanding and solidifying the Abraham Accords, the hallmark diplomatic achievement of his first term. Brokered by Jared Kushner, these agreements normalized relations between Israel and several Sunni Arab states, including the U.A.E and Bahrain. Trump’s reelection has reinvigorated the prospect of achieving these accords, with Saudi Arabia seen as the linchpin to establishing a broader coalition against Iran.

By transactionally offering economic incentives, security guarantees, and strengthened ties with Washington, Trump’s first administration persuaded Gulf states to overlook their grievances with Israel and instead focus on shared concerns about Iran’s “Shia Crescent” ambitions. However, Saudi Arabia has remained cautious, tying its potential participation to progress on Palestinian statehood—fundamentally explaining Hamas’s Iran-backed October 7, 2023, attack on Isreal as a spoiler to the accords. Despite this, Trump’s team believes the Saudis may be willing to sign on in exchange for substantial U.S. military support and guarantees of security against Iran, especially in the context of Trump’s madman approach, which will leave detractors on edge. 

Key figures in Trump’s administration are expected to play pivotal roles in advancing these efforts. Secretary of State nominee Marco Rubio, a staunch supporter of Israel and critic of Iran, is poised to lead diplomatic efforts aimed at strengthening U.S.-Sunni alliances. Rubio’s hawkish stance on Tehran aligns closely with Trump’s goal of isolating Iran while fostering closer ties with Sunni-majority states. Defense Secretary nominee Pete Hegseth, outspoken in his support of Israel’s security interests, would likely reinforce these alliances through military cooperation and arms deals.

Jared Kushner, who spearheaded the original Abraham Accords, will reportedly remain a central figure in Trump’s Middle East policy without taking a formal job, as his personal relationships with Gulf leaders from Trump’s first term are thought to be indispensable in pushing the accords forward. Special envoy Steve Witkoff, another Trump confidant, is tasked to expand economic partnerships between Israel and Arab nations, leveraging his development background in the oil-rich region. 

Former Arkansas Governor Mike Huckabee is Trump’s pick for ambassador to Israel—an unsympathetic Christian Right critic of Palestine. While he will lack policymaking authority, Huckabee’s preference for permanent Israeli annexation of the West Bank signals to the Saudis and other Arab states that Trump will align the U.S. with Netanyahu’s far-right religious parties if Abraham Accord negotiations do not recommence despite popular discontent over the Gaza war throughout the Persian Gulf. Likewise, Trump’s appointment of Republican congresswoman Elise Stefanik as ambassador to the U.N. will reinforce America’s unapologetic support for Israel against Iran and its proxies on the world stage.

However, Trump’s favoring of Sunni alliances and Israel may deepen the Sunni-Shia divide in the Middle East. Trump’s previous “maximum pressure” campaign of crippling sanctions failed to renegotiate the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) with more restrictions on Iran’s nuclear program, instead leading to Iran establishing nefarious networks with Russia and China to skate U.S. sanctions while doubling down on their support for Hamas, Hezbollah, and other terrorist actors committed to thwarting U.S. interests.

Trump’s new administration will likely prioritize the disarmament of Hezbollah, viewing the group as a critical threat to Israel’s security and a key node in Iran’s regional strategy, but Tehran’s calculated restraint in Syria should not be expected to carry over. Iran will not passively stand by while Trump strongarms their Sunni neighbors into a U.S.-steered, Western-leaning entente. Russia and China will presumably have something to say on the matter as well in their attempt to fortify their own anti-West axis (as demonstrated by China’s mediation efforts to reconcile Saudi Arabia and Iran’s differences).

As Trump prepares to take office, his second-term Middle East strategy is shaping up to be a continuation of his first-term approach: coercing Sunni states, targeting radical groups, and undermining Iran. However, the unresolved Israel-Palestine conflict, volatility of Lebanon, and power vacuum in Syria all present challenges to achieving lasting stability that were not present his previous go-around.

Critics argue that Trump’s policies prioritize short-term gains over sustainable peace, exacerbating sectarian tensions and empowering authoritarian regimes. Nevertheless, his reelection has already begun fundamentally reshaping the Middle East. Whether his second term will strengthen alliances and consolidate U.S.-Israel regional influence or deepen Middle Eastern divisions and harden anti-West sentiment remains to be seen—but there is little doubt that Trump’s return to the White House has transformative implications for the Middle East.