Less than a year into his presidency, Brazilian President Lula Da Silva has brought back Brazil on the global stage. In a remarkable foreign policy turnaround, the left-wing leader has overturned the legacy of four years of Bolsonaro’s nationalist and isolationist approaches. Through efforts to integrate Brazil into globalised markets, refusing dogmatic ideological alignment, and renewing regional dialogue, Lula seems to be reinforcing the region’s politico-economic independence vis-à-vis Western, and especially American traditional influence over the region. Brazil being Latin America’s economic giant, its political empowerment, if successful, will likely trickle-down on that of Latin America as a whole. 

The renewal of regional dialogue is largely facilitated by the current left-wing governmental majority in South America, granting Lula the position of pioneer in Latin-America’s multilateralist rebirth. This project requires diplomatic audacity, especially in the choice of interlocutors, such as inviting Venezuela’s Nicolas Maduro to Brasilia, ahead of the second Latin American leaders’ summit in June 2023. This move, defying the West’s recognition of Juan Guaido as President of Venezuela, could represent a new hope for the country which is in a political deadlock since 2019, representing the region’s principal instability source. With such significant recent strategic diplomatic manoeuvres, trade alliances and partnerships, Lula’s foreign policy indeed seems to be unleashing an unseen wave of Latin-American unity and assertiveness.

Portrait of Latin-America’s left-wing icon. 

When it comes to regional initiatives between left-wing leaders, Lula retains a particularly revered status. Indeed, he is considered a veteran in South American left-wing politics, earning him the position as leader of the currently left-dominated Latin-America. Originally a metal factory worker, Lula entered politics in 1980 as a syndicalist, opposing Figueiredo’s US-backed neoliberal dictatorship. After three unsuccessful presidential campaigns, he was finally elected in 2002, and re-elected in 2006, and 2022. As a member of the ‘old-school’ left-wing, preceding iconic leftist South American politicians such as Chavez or Morales, Lula benefits from a natural leadership in the left-wing South American current. 

According to EU Council President Charles Michel, Lula pursues “an integrationist vision”. Lula is waging an international diplomatic crusade, embodying Brazilian and overall Latin-American interests. During his first term, Lula particularly emphasised the strengthening of Mercosur, the economic community of South American countries. Resembling the debut of the European Union as the ECSC (European Coal and Steel Community), the Mercosur vows to establish unified customs and a common external tariff, facilitating regional trade. Lula notably aimed at integrating the Mercosur into globalised markets, negotiating a bilateral trade agreement. Lula has reignited dialogue with his European counterparts to push for the agreement to be enacted, designating it as “urgent and indispensable”. To discuss the matter, French President Macron will receive him in Paris on June 22, 2023, a week after President of the EU Commission Ursula Von der Leyen was received in Brasilia. 

The spearhead of non-alignment. 

Lula, aspiring to a multipolar world, faces significant challenges in the region which remains partially structured by the remnants of the Monroe doctrine. As a politician who rose in opposition to Brazil’s US-backed dictatorship, anti-Americanism is inherent to him. During his first term, he pursued extensive Pan-American ideological non-alignment in foreign policy, exemplified by establishing bilateral dialogue with Iran around the nuclear dossier, reflecting mutual contempt towards the sanctions hindering Iran’s nuclear development. Lula’s foreign policy furthermore embodies diplomatic boldness, fostering a genuine sentiment of Brazilian, and overall Southern empowerment. This includes publicly opposing and condemning the Iraq war, or demanding a permanent UN Security Council seat for Brazil. Most strikingly and recently, Lula’s non-aligned stance drew Western criticism for his neutrality regarding Russia’s aggression in Ukraine. 

One cannot forget the significant cooperation Lula undertakes and develops with China. Lula had already greatly cooperated with Beijing during his previous terms, notably agreeing to sign a $10 billion bilateral loan-for-oil deal, in return for a ten-year guaranteed oil supply. In April 2023, Lula was received in Beijing by his Chinese counterpart, explicitly specifying the strategic nature of the Sino-Brazilian relationship, which would be a top priority of his term. Since 2009, China is Brazil’s largest trading partner, and Brasilia, desperately seeking sustainable foreign investment, increasingly turns towards Beijing to find the kind of investments Washington cannot provide. This, added to Lula’s intrinsic desire to detach Latin-America from US influence, results in the current Sino-Brazilian relationship, which is set to continue crescendoing towards greater cooperation. It is worth noting that despite Brasilia’s strong sympathy towards China, Lula acknowledges the importance of the US as a commercial partner in Foreign Direct Investments (FDI). The symbolism of Lula’s visit exemplifies his doctrine: his administration strategically juxtaposed his diplomatic visits to Washington and Beijing, demonstrating Brazil’s free-will to alternate its allies depending on how much they have to offer. 

Rebirth of Latin-America’s unity-building.

In a context of regional ideological homogeneity, the timing of Lula’s re-election was largely favourable, seized by him as an opportunity to unleash his cooperative strategy. Currently, most Latin American countries except for Ecuador, Paraguay, and Uruguay, are governed by left-wing governments, facilitating the setting of a common agenda, and subsequently regional unity. This was reflected through the two summits of Latin American leaders held in less than six months. The first one, held in January 2023 in Buenos Aires, hosted the 33 members of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC). Brazil had pulled out of the group after Bolsonaro criticised it for allegedly supporting the undemocratic governments of Nicaragua, Venezuela, and Cuba. Having re-joined the organisation, Lula declared Brazil was now “ready to work side-by-side with you with a very strong feeling of solidarity and closeness.” By his positive perception of the Mercosur and the strengthening of multilateral mechanisms, Lula is seemingly seeking to unify Latin-America into one ‘block’, capable of holding an ideological stand of its own. Such enterprise is undertaken by Lula through all means necessary, even if it risks fostering regional and Western discontent. 

This risk was taken during the second Latin-American leaders’ summit held in May 2023. Lula began by advocating for a “union of South America”, “setting aside ideological divisions which interrupted efforts of regional integration”. Thus, all parties, regardless of political disparities, had to be summoned. Therefore, the choice was made to host Nicolas Maduro as Venezuela’s head of state, who was declared persona-non-grata on Brazilian soil by Bolsonaro in 2020. This major upheaval in Latin-America’s balance of power allows holistic dialogue in view of building Lula’s united Latin-America, but also offers renewed hope for Venezuela, which has endured political, economic, and social hardship since 2015, destabilising the region. By disregarding American recognition of Juan Guaido as Venezuela’s interim president, Lula once again struck with his non-aligned vision, reflecting an empowered Brazil seeking to embody a non-aligned model. Additionally, Maduro’s presence at the summit, although displeasing some, signalled the urgency to act towards Venezuela’s crisis, setting aside ideological disparities hindering the cooperation needed to tackle the crisis.

But Lula’s ambition spans further than solely diplomatic and political ambitions, as it has recently been demonstrated by the project of a common trade currency between Argentina and Brazil. It is not the first time these two South American giants have sought the establishment of a common currency. The first model of the project was abandoned in 1988, due to economic turmoil. The project holds multiple goals: reducing the reliance on the US dollar, and avoiding future economic crises which are especially recurrent in Argentina, as it is currently fighting to avoid its tenth sovereign default crisis since its independence in 1816. But analysts remain sceptical towards the project, and especially towards its regional expansion, based on legitimate reasons. 

Building a fortress on quicksand.

Maduro’s presence at the summit has backlashes on the fragile regional unity, as Uruguay and Chilean Presidents stated they firmly condemned Maduro’s invitation. Secondly, this move, although highly symbolic, could hinder Lula’s integrationist ambitions, especially when it comes to Western support. Indeed, the Mercosur-EU deal may comprehend the condition of Lula’s commitment to defend democracy, incompatible with Maduro’s 10-year undemocratic reign. Furthermore, the existing ideological disparities, although minor, could intensify in front of such radical decisions. Indeed, the main point of dissonance and threat to Lula’s federative ambitions, as noted by Dr. Ignacio Bartesaghi, is the remaining minoritarian ideological disparities, since Latin-American leaders still do not unanimously recognize each other. 

As of the latest Latin American leaders’ summit, all guests were dealing with domestic issues, making Latin-American unity secondary. In Peru, the political stage remains fogged after President Castillo’s ousting in December 2022. In Ecuador, President Lasso has recently dissolved Congress to prevent a likely no confidence vote. And in Chile, President Boric is severely weakened, having failed to enforce ‘the world’s most progressive constitution’. Even if this newly engaged multilateralism was to incite Latin-American leaders to pursue this path, the longevity of such enterprise is questionable. Firstly, Latin-American leaders are likely to delay their focus on regional unity, prioritising the survival  of their incumbency. Additionally, Latin-America is known for its ideological volatility, suddenly oscillating from left to right and vice-versa. In the words of Jimena Blanco, head of the Americas at risk consultancy Verisk Maplecroft, the rapidly changing political winds in the region are unlikely to facilitate the prolonged necessary political conditions to develop such a fundamental political, ideological, and monetary shift.

Conclusion. 

Lula’s current policies and ambitions are not new. Indeed, they reflect the continuity of his political project, stemming from his inherent desire for Brazilian empowerment and Latin-American self-determination. The current left-dominated Latin-American political structure is undoubtedly a rare opportunity which he has seized upon to promote his uplifting visions regionally. Ambitious on the cooperative, monetary, and diplomatic future of Latin-America, he is faced with interior threats, due ideological divergences which jeopardise Lula’s desired regional unity. Exterior threats, such as Western pressure to commute his cooperation with autocracies and align with Western positions, could also undermine the project. However, the biggest threat to Lula’s desired momentum is the rapid and equally radical changing political dynamics of Latin-America. Indeed, to attain sustainability for his new model, Lula must rapidly demonstrate results. If he fails, the chain reaction is unlikely to happen, leaving Brazil alone in its endeavour, contrarily encouraging a regional shift to the right.