Editor’s note: This piece was the third-place finalist in The London Globalist’s First Annual Writing Competition about how COVID-19 is changing society. To read the winning piece, click here. We’ll be publishing the other finalists in the weeks ahead.

If there is anything that we ought to expect in the coming years after this period of significant dislocation, it is a torrent of literature on how the coronavirus has changed society. The pandemic has altered life in subtle and not-so-subtle ways, and while the virus appears to have finally entered its concluding stages with the roll-out of several vaccines, it is likely to shape politics for some time to come.

A prominent typology of contemporary Western politics that has benefitted from the coronavirus is David Goodhart’s idea of ‘Anywheres’ and ‘Somewheres’, the socio-political formulation denoting the cultural disconnect between ‘the people’ and ‘the elites’. The theory conveys a dispute over political authority, with the former favouring national sovereignty and the latter cosmopolitan internationalism. The explosion of national populist movements onto the political scene in recent years, and their repudiation of what they perceive as the liberal international order’s erosion of state sovereignty, is perhaps the most obvious manifestation of this dynamic.

The constrictive nature of the coronavirus response has helped nationalist movements challenge  the global liberal order. In shutting down societies en masse, lockdowns have shifted the dial in many citizens’ minds from eagerly accepting the outside world to approaching it with a semblance of scepticism and caution. In prompting this shift, COVID-19 has legitimised the nation-state once again by re-centring it as an important political force in contemporary politics. The effects of this change on politics as we know it are yet to wholly manifest, but may be profound.

Take international trade, for instance. The pandemic has pushed countries to reconsider the genesis of their products, as its freeze on global supply chains not only jolted society into fears of deprivation—triggering ‘panic-buying’ in some countries—but also highlighted the potential insecurity of essential commodities. The United States Congress is now working through several bills to reduce America’s reliance on China for vital pharmaceutical supplies, as policymakers have raised the alarm for the possibility of China ‘weaponizing’ drug exports, given the majority of American drugs are manufactured in China and India.

Similarly, a recent report found that Australia is “dangerously dependent on medical imports”, as 90% of its pharmaceuticals are produced overseas. Australia’s foreign drug imports have increased by 50% in the past decade, which is far from uncommon among Western democracies. Germany imports 63% of its generic active pharmaceutical ingredients from Asia and 33% from Europe—an almost complete reversal of its manufacturing numbers just two decades ago. The United Kingdom, France, and Spain have recorded similar trajectories.

Given these figures, the pandemic’s destabilization of global trade has spurred many governments to question their position in the global supply chain network. Moreover, China’s increased assertiveness on the world stage—exemplified, for instance, by Beijing’s damaging tariffs on Australian industries in retaliation against Canberra’s call for an independent investigation into the coronavirus—has alerted many states to the strategic risks of foreign reliance. Whether global supply chains will adjust to meet these concerns is yet to be seen.

On the social front, in contrast to the generally hostile media coverage that follows national populist movements, the coronavirus has illuminated some positive aspects of national solidarity. The virus has shown the nation’s unique capacity to mobilise collective action through its ability to galvanise social trust. It has reminded citizens that the overarching socio-political framework in which they reside is not merely a vessel of cultural import in the form of a national football team or peculiar dish, but an essential social organism that enables camaraderie and coordination in the face of collective challenge.

By making Westphalian state sovereignty acutely visible once again and showcasing its robustness under duress, the virus may have quietly validated political movements that claim ‘the nation’ as their core pitch. With national populism still challenging conventional politics in many Western countries, the virus may have, implicitly or otherwise, strengthened these movements.

To this end, the national populist phenomenon witnessed in recent years may be among the few to have profited from the coronavirus. Each respective society will face its own challenges in this regard. What appears to be universal, however, is that a ‘return to normalcy’ may be around the corner with vaccine roll-outs, but it also may well be a nostalgic dream in the realm of international affairs.