2023 saw Asia swept by election fever – and 2024 will look no different. 2024 began with the Bangladeshi general election on January 7^th, and will come to see Indians, South Koreans, Mongolians, and Pakistanis amongst others heading to the polls. More so than for its domestic political impact, the 2024 election wave in Asia holds large international implications – mainly for laying the groundwork of the growing bifurcation between Indian and Chinese spheres of influence. Bangladesh is no different. The results of January 7^th were largely welcomed by China and India alike, as it  seeks to continue equal levels of cooperation with either to hedge its security in a potential clash of the titans. This article will focus on why Bangladesh will become an important battleground for the manifestation of India-China tensions; a battleground that will hold major implications for great power politics in Asia as a whole.

Although polls officially opened on the 7^th of January, Hasina successfully secured her fifth term as early as November following an election boycott by their largest opposition. The nature of the Bangladeshi elections is representative of growing democratic backsliding in the region. As the world’s largest democracy, New Delhi’s eager acceptance of incumbent PM Sheikh Hasina’s victory stands in stark contradiction to the principles of the liberal international order. Instead, an unwillingness to isolate Bangladesh should they fall into the sphere of Chinese influence has been prioritised, signifying a desire for the continuation of the political status quo.

The Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) had run their campaign demanding a return to the ‘neutral caretaker government system’, wherein a neutral, interim government will preside over the country during election period and will take charge of election management to ensure freedom and fairness. The system is usually considered as having delivered credible results; but it has also usually delivered victories for the opposition. The ruling Awami League controversially dismantled this in the Supreme Court – a decision which allowed them to control legislation and electioneering during the campaigning period, results of which have seen deadly clashes between civilians and police. Over 8,000 senior leaders and supporters of the BNP were arrested according to the Human Rights Watch, in what they claim was an “overt attempt to incapacitate the competition and disqualify opposition leaders from participating”.

Hasina’s government drew harsh criticism from the United States who have enacted visa bans, and the EU, who deployed their own Election Expert Mission to make public their report on the election’s integrity. However, the reality remains that this does very little when India and China have accepted the outcome with open arms. While the West does remain the largest destination of Bangladesh’s gargantuan garments industry, India and China remain its largest source of imports and funds, for major infrastructure projects that increase trade connectivity. Hasina’s ability to negotiate mutual benefits and balance great power ambitions against national interest has seen her reap the political rewards of a combined $40bn worth of bilateral trade. Much like India’s own foreign policy, the guiding dogma is one of strategic autonomy — the benefits of economic multilateralism have, as estimated by the World Bank, seen more than 25 million people lifted out of poverty in the last 20 years, with a growth rate surpassing that of India’s. However, the legitimacy of the Hasina government in the eyes of the post-pandemic West is one that is beginning to falter. Massive inflation, and the need for an IMF bail-out loan has seen large-scale public discontent and fallout, alongside targeted American sanctions, and international condemnation. This is where Bangladesh sees importance in their continuation as the India-China nexus, the fruits of their relationship substantial enough for both sides to feel the same.

Currently, the only access from the Indian mainland to its north-eastern states is through an extremely narrow strip of land known as the Siliguri Corridor, stretching 20km through Nepal, Bhutan, and Bangladesh. This possession of land is being increasingly threatened by the Chinese – since 2015, they have encouraged Chinese citizens to form settlement communities into Bhutan and establish a systematic network of villages, in what Foreign Policy interprets as a mass settlement movement preceding the point of eventual annexation. India thus sees Bangladesh as a crucial physical and economic buffer – projects are being negotiated for improvements to trade infrastructure and economic exchanges with the motivation of preventing a Chinese chokehold on underdeveloped and extremely crucial lines of trade. This explains the more than $7bn that has been offered by India in concessional Lines of Credit (LOCs) for these projects, seeking to diversify means of economic exchange not just between India and Bangladesh, but as a by-pass to India’s north-eastern extremities.

With a rising pro-Chinese sentiment in South Asia, India has recognised the need for maintaining good relations in their own backyard. The Maldives has recently followed the Sri Lankans in allowing a growing Chinese presence in their affairs, and with Pakistan already deeply entrenched in their relations with China, India finds themselves growing increasingly encircled. It is therefore crucial to Indian regional and economic security that they maintain strong ties with the Bangladeshis, the up-and-coming powerhouse of the region. A Chinese ‘string-of-pearls’ strategy has seen them secure key ports around the Indian subcontinent in Gwadar (Pakistan), Hambantota (Sri Lanka), Kyaukpyu (Myanmar) and Chittagong (Bangladesh). It is therefore imperative to Indian regional security that Bangladesh, already overly dependent on China for its military requirements, remains wary of its integration into the Chinese sphere of influence.

China and Bangladesh made 27 agreements pertaining to the Belt and Road Initiative in 2016 – an integration of the South Asian region into the Chinese economic framework that has gone on to include every country in the region minus India and Bhutan. Regarding Bangladesh, this agreement saw China become their biggest foreign line of credit – $24bn to be precise, an amount when compared to the Indian LOC is gargantuan. China’s promise to develop road and rail infrastructure in the region has seen it gain access to various key ports, the one in Bangladesh being Chittagong – which gives it principal access to the Bay of Bengal. This is a strategy that China has been able to utilise with great success across the region. Following the Sri Lankan financial crisis, it was forced to default on foreign debt in May 2022, resulting in a negotiation of debt restructuring. The consistent failure of the Chinese-funded Hambantota Port Development Project saw the succeeding government repaying debts via the port being handed to China on a 99-year lease instead. China now sits just a few hundred miles off the Indian shore, famously causing an uproar by docking a military ship at Hambantota; demonstrative of the potential for the port as a military base at some point, as they are breathing down the neck of India. 

Pakistan’s and Bangladesh’s growing economic and military dependence, Sri Lankan incurred debts, and now the souring of relations between India and Maldives are all beacons of opportunity for the Chinese economic machine. Lucrative financial support and taking advantage of India’s precarious regional situation is creating systems of dependence that put further pressure on the liberal international status quo. Bangladesh now stands as a key point of integration for Chinese foreign policy, as China increasingly leaves its mark on key nodes of global investment and trade. Efforts will undoubtedly be made to pry them away from Indian cooperation, the benefits of which are clearly seen within Indian-alienated South Asia.

Two states that are already involved in minor physical disputes in the Himalayas are now seeing a much larger, material war for influence playing out with Bangladesh as their newest battleground. With more and more states needing to give in to Chinese demands due to extreme disparities in leverage, Bangladesh now has a major decision to make. Will this path of strategic autonomy pay off in the long run, or will they be forced to integrate into either sphere of influence as the cards are increasingly dealt against them? Furthermore, as regimes like India and China continue to back regimes like Hasina’s for their own political agendas, the level of democratic backsliding that is occurring in South Asia is only being furthered. India themselves have been accused of progressive autocratising, and with the CCP in China, the political culture of the South Asian region is in limbo. Bangladesh and its future between two great powers vying for influence will continue to be a crucial battleground, amongst other international trends that suggest an increasing bifurcation of centres of power and influence in South Asia.

It is therefore evident that Bangladesh serves as the current fulcrum of the great power struggle between India and China. With substantial influence being made all around the Indian subcontinent in Sri Lanka, Maldives and Pakistan, the next domino to fall in the eyes of the Chinese would logically be Bangladesh. For India, Bangladesh is ideally the first step in a re-construction of their neighbourhood relations. For too long have they alienated those in their own backyard in the pursuit of equal footing with their Western counterparts, and now is the time for them to begin a reconstruction of these relationships by proving just how attractive they can be — one that they now find themselves with adequate resources to do so. While a relationship with Pakistan may be too far to salvage, there is opportunity for India to nullify the effects of a potential Chinese chokehold in the political sphere. India is in a crucial moment where it can demonstrate that the relationships it brings to the region will be truly mutually beneficial in the long run, a relationship with the absence of coercion. Bangladesh poses the greatest exit at the current juncture, with its demonstrated potential for economic progress. Time will tell how the battle for influence will pan out, but more importantly on which side of the struggle Bangladesh will choose to go all in, should they find the need to.

Pranav Harish is a student at the London School of Economics and an editor with the London Globalist