In December 1962, American statesman Dean Acheson described the United Kingdom as a post-imperial power struggling to find its new role in the world. Nearly 60 years later, Britain is once again searching.

After four and a half torturous years, the UK is out of the European Union. But the world into which Britain steps could hardly be less welcoming. Liberal democracy appears to be in retreat, competition among the great powers is intensifying, and the COVID-19 pandemic rages on.

Nonetheless, the British government has sought to project optimism. Prime Minister Boris Johnson says the UK can reinvent itself as a “Global Britain”. Freed from the EU’s shackles, he argues, Britain can inject some swagger into its diplomacy, strengthening old alliances and looking to new horizons.

Britain does have several assets of its own. It is one of five-nuclear armed states with a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. It is a member of NATO and the “Five Eyes” intelligence group. It also boasts a relatively strong military and leads the 54-nation Commonwealth.

Nonetheless, the UK has struggled to develop a strategy that makes use of these assets. Johnson’s “Global Britain” suggests ambitions far beyond Europe. Yet the idea remains little more than a slogan. The PM refers to the UK as a “world-beater,” but lacks a clear understanding of where Britain’s interests lie and where its resources can be best utilised. Slogans and vaulting rhetoric are no substitutes for a cohesive foreign policy. Moreover, many of Johnson’s “ideas” for post-Brexit policy are simply not rooted in actuality. Whether the policy in question regards US-UK relations or Britain’s role in Asia, there is a sharp contrast between the PM’s vision for British foreign policy and the geopolitical realities facing the UK. Here are a few examples.

The ‘Special Relationship’

Leading up to the 2016 Brexit referendum, Johnson argued that, outside the EU, the British would be “even better and more valuable allies of the United States”. London’s relationship with Washington had long been “special”. Brexit was an opportunity to raise it to another level.

This could not be farther from the truth. 

Brexit has severely diminished Britain’s importance to the United States. For 40-odd years since Britain joined the European Community in 1975, the UK served as a sort of bridge between the United States and continental Europe. It was a supportive, Atlanticist voice in Brussels that promoted the United States’ agenda. With that came diplomatic leverage in Washington. Brexit destroyed that role. In leaving the EU, Britain surrendered its unrestricted access to European intelligence databases and its voice in shaping EU policy. US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken has already stated he sees Germany, not the UK, as the United States’ most important European ally. Without a seat at the table in Brussels, Britain is less useful to Washington. As for trade, the UK is not a priority for the United States. As much as Johnson talks up the potential for a US-UK trade deal, he will have to wait his turn behind Brussels; the EU provides a market for about 16 percent of US exports, whereas the UK takes less than 5 percent.

However, Britain can still remain a useful partner to the United States in certain areas. President Biden is committed to working with European allies and fighting climate change. Conveniently, the UK will be chairing this year’s COP26 climate summit in Glasgow. It will also take the presidency of the G7 club, allowing it to set this year’s agenda for the group’s annual summit. Washington and London are also becoming increasingly aligned on China. Johnson’s government has recently taken a hawkish stance towards Beijing, particularly on human rights and technology issues. This could make Britain a valuable ally for the United States as the Biden Administration seeks to develop a coordinated approach toward China.

But while Biden will still see the UK as an important ally, he can also afford to pay less attention to London and more to Berlin and other EU capitals. The special relationship of old is not coming back.

A ‘Tilt’ to the Indo-Pacific?

 A key element of Johnson’s post-Brexit foreign policy vision is the notion of rebalancing UK policy towards the world’s fastest-growing region: Asia.

Unlike France and Germany, the UK has not released an Indo-Pacific strategy. There are signs, however, of increased British activity in the region. Johnson’s government has opened discussion to join the Comprehensive Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). Foreign Secretary Dominic Raab is pushing for the UK to become the “dialogue partner” of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Plans are also underway to deploy the Royal Navy’s biggest fleet of warships in a generation to the Indo-Pacific this year.

But there are significant geographic and financial limitations to establishing a strong UK presence in Asia. For one, it is unclear how much Britain can really achieve in the Indo-Pacific. The British Armed Forces lack the capacity to effectively project power in the region, especially since the bulk of the UK’s military resources remain concentrated in Europe. It will be difficult for Britain to serve as anything more than a secondary player in Asian security. It is also questionable how central the Indo-Pacific is to British interests. Spending on a military presence well beyond the Atlantic may prove hard to justify to the British public.

The European Question

And then there is Europe. Despite leaving the EU, Britain has shown an interest in continuing “E3” security discussions with France and Germany. But it also insisted foreign policy and defense cooperation be excluded from the Brexit withdrawal negotiations. Moreover, Johnson’s government has avoided almost any mention of the EU in its discussions of foreign policy after Brexit.

That said, relations with Europe will remain crucial to any UK foreign policy. Britain is still geographically part of Europe. The UK and the EU share many of the same perceived threats to their security, including Russian aggression, nuclear proliferation, migration, and terrorism. Britain and its European neighbors also share many of the same global goals, like combatting climate change. This all points towards the need for more, not less, cooperation between London and Brussels. While the UK may have left the EU, it cannot escape the facts of its geography.

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Together, these realities point to Britain’s lack of a clear sense of what role it should play in the world. Rosy rhetoric cannot cover the vulnerability of Britain’s international position after Brexit. Until the UK develops a coherent and realistic strategy, it will struggle to navigate today’s increasingly complex geopolitical landscape.