30 August 2023 marked the end of a decades-long political dynasty in Gabon. President Ali Bongo, who had just won his dubious re-election, was deposed by the Republican Guard led by Brigade General Brice Oligui, now sitting as the interim head of state. The event is by no means an oddity in the region. Just a month prior, Niger fell into the hands of the military, rapidly inviting global attention due to its strategic significance in the region, especially from the American point of view — much like Gabon to the French.

Africa is arguably the most democratically unstable region in the world in recent years. With ten coups taking place since 2020, the region now enters an era where coups are becoming extremely prevalent with the most attempts made and the highest success rate within a three-year period. A number of factors contribute to this fact, but there is always one in common — the dissatisfaction of impoverished people, including the military, towards regimes which, despite usually being covered by a (sham) democratic election, pursue their own interests rather than their nation’s.

The international community is feeling uneasy about the future of the world’s second-most populous continent. While this may be motivated by the good intention of preventing the contagion of the ‘coup trap’, the methods used are far from effective in bringing about meaningful changes to the region.

Decline of the Iron Fist, Legitimised Rise of the Juntas

ECOWAS announced its plans for military intervention in Niger in mid-August. It was the next step, following sanctions, to compel the leadership into seceding power. Thanks to the divide among nations in the region, it would be an understatement to say that this gesture would result in greater catastrophe and instability. Luckily, the new prime minister of Niger extended an olive branch to the organisation’s leadership, preventing the worsening of tensions.

This best demonstrates why the use of threats, economic or military, should not be used as a first resort, especially where conflicts can build up fast. The wave of economic sanctions imposed by the UN Security Council against Iraq between 1999 and 2003 is an old wound that still hurts today. The country has been permanently damaged by the all-out measures spearheaded by the US and Britain, the most significant effect being the humanitarian crisis caused by the disruption of the flow of essential goods including food and medicine. The same happened in Zimbabwe after two decades of sanctions, where people’s suffering sparked upheavals and caused an irreversible severing of diplomatic amity.

More importantly, the people within couped African states, unlike those in the Asian countries of Thailand and Myanmar, stand behind their new leaders. Both Gabon’s Oligui and Niger’s Tchiani managed to garner backing as thousands went to the streets moments after their rise to power. Socio-economic discontent and exasperation against authoritarian rulers have driven people to give consent, or at least acquiesce, to the overthrowing of civilian leaders. During puzzling times like this, respect for the popular sovereignty of the state should come first, so long as the junta does not commit atrocities which compel the international community to intervene on humanitarian grounds. The United Nations made cognizant of this when they, in 1973, passed the General Assembly Resolution 3151 G (XXVIII) to acknowledge South Africa’s liberation movements, instead of the apartheid regime, as the authentic representatives of the country due to the overwhelming support they enjoyed. Only then can real talk be initiated.

Cooperation, the New Grand Strategy

It is noticeable by now that the most feasible approach to helping African countries in their restoration of democracy is by embracing the new reality. One must first get past the demonisation of military regimes. Again, different from the predicament in Asia, coups in Africa have always had very little to no casualty. While takeovers are commonly motivated by resentment, they can manifest in vastly distinct ways. Given the right approaches are taken, African coup leaders would very likely be willing to cooperate with outside parties.

First, negotiations between juntas and the international community should be carefully commenced on a levelled table without deprecation. Keeping in mind that these regimes are not the most predictable and should therefore be handled with caution, measures such as terms of negotiation should be put in place to ensure commitment and goodwill from both sides. Abrupt sanctioning, deadline-setting, and military mobilisation should be avoided as they would only provoke unpredictable reactions and jeopardise the talks before it has even started. The channelling of humanitarian assistance is also a requisite at this stage as that would further incentivise cooperation.

During the negotiations, plans for democratic restoration ought to be brought up and discussed. Although reconstructing democracy in a country whose people have been subjected to injustice for decades may seem to be a herculean task at first glance, it is by no means impossible. As proven by post-Salazar Portugal, trust in democracy may be restored after upheavals. While there has yet to be a direct equivalent to the situation in Africa today, the international community through the UN has demonstrated some ability to help states rebuild their governmental systems after conflicts, exemplified by the Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) at the end of last century.

Similarly, transitional justice should be included in the conversation. Using South Africa again as an example, this can be materialised via non-tribunal mechanisms which focus on compromissory justice. A truth and reconciliation commission would prove to be exceptionally instrumental in the case of post-coup democracies in Africa to address not only transgressions made during and after the takeovers but also those committed by the preceding civilian regimes which triggered the coups.

This process should involve as many relevant actors as possible. In Africa, they are the African Union and ECOWAS. While external superpowers and organisations like the UN may have some interest in restoring democracy in these countries, it is their neighbours who are the first to suffer the repercussions of coups. Actors have to strike a delicate balance between cogency and genteelness so that they can exert just enough pressure to push the agenda forward but not too much to avoid unwanted backlashes.

Rafsi Albar is a student, teaching assistant, and researcher at the Faculty of Law, Universitas Gadjah Mada, Indonesia. He is a guest contributor to the London Globalist.