In January 2024, the Taiwanese electorate will vote for a new president and legislative, the results of which will have significant ramifications for China-Taiwan relations. Current polls put the Democratic Progressive Party’s (DPP) Lai Ching-te as favourite to win the presidential election, succeeding two-term DPP president Tsai Ing-wen. Should this occur it will likely worsen the already turbulent Cross-Strait relations. For one, Lai opposes Beijing’s ‘One China’ Policy. Indeed, in 2018 Lai described himself as a ‘Taiwan Independence Worker’. Considering China’s adamancy that Taiwan is only a renegade province, Beijing in August branded Lai a ‘separatist’ and ‘troublemaker through and through’. With an increasing number of people, in particular young people, in Taiwan identifying solely as Taiwanese — rather than Chinese or both — Xi Jinping may consider bringing Taiwan closer via peaceful methods to be a growing challenge. Thus, with the prospect of conflict between China and US-backed Taiwan on the rise, it is critical to understand how the upcoming Taiwanese elections will impact China-Taiwan relations. 

Should Lai become president, political dialogue between China and Taiwan will likely become even more fractured. This breakdown in communication could, as Benjamin Charlton, an East Asia specialist at Oxford Analytica argues, create conditions in which accidents and acts of aggression quickly escalate into full-blown conflict. Given the recent increase in military exercises by China in Taiwanese airspace and the allegation that Xi has ordered China’s military be capable of an invasion of Taiwan by 2027, the threat of conflict is very real. A Lai victory may also result in a ramp-up in economic weapons imposed by Beijing, exemplified by China’s August ban on Taiwanese mango imports on the pretext of a pest infection which, suggestively, followed a visit by Lai to the US. Considering Taiwan’s crucial position in the global supply chain, with the waters surrounding Taiwan being one of the busiest shipping routes in the world, and the fact that Taiwan produces over 60% of the world’s semiconductors, any escalation in economic warfare would severely impact the global economy. Increased cyber-attacks orchestrated by China may also be a result of a Lai victory, with the aim to spread propaganda and intimidate Taiwanese people. This risk of conflict or economic and cyber warfare becomes far more likely under another DPP presidency in light of the mutual contempt held between Beijing and the DPP as a whole, and with Lai in particular.

The January presidential election could also see a significant defeat for the more pro-China Kuomintang (KMT) which may lead Beijing to believe a peaceful resolution to the Taiwan problem to be less viable. This further increases the chances of conflict. The KMT, who were the original government in exile in Taiwan following their defeat to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 1949, are on track to lose a third presidential election in a row with their candidate, Hou Yu-ih, polling at only 15-20%. In fact, the KMT’s position looks likely to worsen with the recent addition of independent candidate Terry Gou, a former KMT member who advocates policies similar to Hou’s, to the race which should result in a split in the already dwindling KMT vote. As the KMT advocates for stronger economic and cultural ties with mainland China and aligns with Beijing in rejecting Taiwanese independence, its decline is a serious concern for Beijing. Indeed, Wen-ti Sung, a political scientist with the Australian National University’s (ANU) Taiwan Studies Program, notes that the failure of the KMT to win in January will prevent any improvement in Cross-Strait relations. The demise of the once dominant KMT, especially after the entry of Gou, not only increases the chance of a Lai victory, but also risks provoking the CCP towards a more conflict-driven approach for the Taiwan problem.

However, a worsening in China-Taiwan relations is not a guaranteed result of the upcoming Taiwanese elections. For starters, the presidential election – for decades a two-horse race between the KMT and DPP since the first democratic elections in 1996 – has seen the dramatic rise of a third party, the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) led by a popular ex-mayor of Taiwan’s capital Taipei, Ko Wen-je. While Ko has focused his campaign on a ‘third way’ platform, he has, critically, advocated for peaceful solutions to the Cross-Strait issue. If Ko’s star continues to rise, with his polling trending upwards at around 20% compared to around 35% for Lai, he could threaten Lai and provide a more acceptable solution to Beijing, although a solo victory for Ko still appears unlikely.

Then, a more probable deescalating consequence of the elections is the potential for a TPP-KMT alliance in Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan. This is as while Lai’s DPP looks poised to win the presidential election, a majority in the legislative election may well not follow – Lai is merely winning a plurality in the polls. Given the dovish stances of the KMT and TPP toward China, they could form an alliance in the Legislative Yuan to block policies deemed too provocative and, as such, work to ease Cross-Strait tensions. The KMT in fact formed a similar alliance during the first DPP presidency of Chen Shui-bian between 2000 and 2008. In this, the KMT allied with the then rising third party, the People First Party (PFP), creating an executive-legislative stalemate that otherwise limited the potential breakdown in China-Taiwan relations. Nonetheless, a Lai victory still presents a considerable barrier to any rebuilding of Cross-Strait relations, and while a political stalemate should check any ‘radical’ DPP policies, the threat of conflict or economic warfare would still be sure to increase.

Even in a scenario involving a clear presidential victory for Lai, the KMT in disarray, and a DPP majority in the Legislative Yuan, a full blown conflict in the Taiwan Strait is not inevitable. For one, Russia’s catastrophic failings in Ukraine may showcase to Beijing that a forceable reunification may not go to plan, with small defensive forces being able to inflict significant casualties on a larger army. Also, as the renowned China professor Rana Mitter notes, Taiwan is a hub for international media regarding China. Thus, worldwide coverage of a Chinese invasion would be disastrous for Xi’s efforts in improving China’s global image as a peaceful power seeking economic partnerships. Lastly, the US commitment to deterrence is essential for a de-escalation of tensions. Following the war in Ukraine, the US appears to be taking a clearer stance in protecting the rules-based international order, and Taiwan’s survival as a liberal democracy in the Asia-Pacific is central to this international order. Indeed, in September 2022, the US passed the Taiwan Policy Act in which it will provide $4.5 billion over four years to strengthen Taiwan’s military. With this substantial military support and the precedent of financial weapons used against Russia, Xi would surely consider a full-scale invasion hugely costly both militarily and economically. 

In all, China-Taiwan relations can be expected to worsen following the 2024 Taiwanese elections. This is principally due to the mutual disdain held between the predicted future president, Lai, and Beijing. This could result in the evaporation of Cross-Strait political dialogue and China resorting to increasingly violent means to pursue its goal of reunification. The projected demise of the KMT as a major political force in this election will only serve to exacerbate these conditions. Some near future, potential consequences of a Lai victory at the expense of the KMT include border skirmishes, a blockade of Taiwan, and cyber-attacks by China. Should Beijing exert stronger control over Taiwan, it would be a significant strategic gain, with China being able to exert greater influence in the Asia-Pacific. However, the prospect of a full-scale Chinese invasion in the coming years remains low. A possible, albeit unlikely, presidential victory for the TPP and its relatively China-friendly leader Ko would allow a reduction in tensions. A more realistic, de-escalating result of the upcoming elections would be a KMT-TPP alliance in the Legislative Yuan. This alliance would ideally block DPP policies that might provoke China towards war, yet Beijing may still make further use of financial weapons. Other mitigating factors include awareness of Putin’s disaster in Ukraine, China’s consideration of its global image, and the possible US response, although a US-China war is still highly unlikely. That being said, when considering the upcoming elections, the threat of Cross-Strait conflict as well as the use of economic and cyber warfare looks poised to rise with its implications potentially enormous for the global economy and international order.

Finlay Sleeman is a second-year BSc Economic History student and an Asia Correspondent for the London Globalist.