Amidst ongoing geopolitical rivalry between the world’s two hegemonic giants, China and America, many Southeast Asian states are caught in the middle. China’s power preponderance against the backdrop of American devaluation of political and economic prestige has propelled the narrative that China’s emergence as a global hegemon will rival, and may eventually surpass, America’s. As Sino-American interests in the region differ, the prospect of a military confrontation increases if their opposing visions clash. Located at the epicentre of the competition between China and the US, many Southeast Asian states are forced to strike a balance between the two powers to secure their national interests. 

China

China’s pervasiveness in Southeast Asia invites both opportunities and anxieties for regional governments. Beijing’s primary strengths include its geographic proximity and economic prowess. Xi Jinping’s ambitious Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), launched in 2013, is a vast collection of investment initiatives that aim to enhance global trade connectivity. Its ‘Maritime Belt’ passes through Southeast Asia and addresses the region’s substantial infrastructure deficit. Although wary of the initiative, Southeast Asian governments are amenable to the project due to the prospect of vast economic benefits made available through engagement. Without Chinese investments, the region requires funding equal to 5% of their GDP to cover infrastructure growth between 2016 and 2030. As a result, the BRI is welcomed by governments, where Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao PDR, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam have signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with China to signal their participation. As Beijing showers its neighbours with money and projects, it continues to secure its geopolitical influence over states whose development both requires and relies on the need for heavy investment.

As a result, there are notable economic and political concerns that accompany these projects. If Southeast Asian states are too receptive to Beijing’s economic packages, governments risk ceding their sovereignty to Chinese coercion. Anxieties of increasing national debt, loss of sovereign rights and unfair financial terms emerge as Beijing has been known to use economic statecraft to advance geopolitical ambitions. The risk posed by extending loans to developing governments is that recipient states are ensnared in a debt trap leaving them vulnerable to China’s dominance. China has quickly risen to be a dominant power in Southeast Asia, reflected in its assertive approach to the region. This leaves in question the US role and engagement with the region. 

America

American power has been immense in the development of postcolonial Southeast Asia, as market-oriented reform in Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia exceeded communist-based economic structures exported to Vietnam and Cambodia. Yet, observers have noted relative disengagement of late in the region. A report issued by Singapore-based Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS) “State of Southeast Asia 2020” surveyed 1,300 policymakers, journalists and businesspeople, across 10 states. Its results depict how confidence in US engagement has dramatically declined. Some 47% of  respondents have little or no confidence in the United States as a strategic partner and provider of regional security, based on the belief that the US has neglected its previous commitments. More than three-quarters believe that U.S. engagement with Southeast Asia has declined under the Trump administration, reinforced by the American withdrawal from the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP). Many spectators have interpreted the failure of the pact as America’s declining interest in the region. In light of current trends, analysts describe US involvement in the region as having oscillated away from intense intervention toward political and economic neglect. 

If the US does not reassert its stance, it risks eroding its longstanding influence, especially in relation to China’s advance in the region. The US National Security Strategy (2021) overtly expresses these concerns, asserting that “China seeks to displace the United States in the Indo-Pacific region, expand the reaches of its state-driven economic model, and reorder the region in its favour.” Washington is aware of the risk that an assertive China poses, but its policies to increase engagement in the region ranks low on President Biden’s agenda. Should America’s disengagement persist, China’s growing presence is likely to undermine America’s long term hegemonic position in the region. The challenge America faces, therefore, is to fill this vacuum through strengthening its commitments.

How will Southeast Asia respond?

The theory of hedging is important in the discussion of great power politics and smaller states in southeast Asia. It stipulates that states orient and seek a closer relationship with the great power perceived to be geopolitically dominant at a given time, but do not align exclusively with that power. For instance, Singapore’s pragmatic approach to Sino-American rivalry is facilitated by maintaining strong diplomatic ties within the practice of strategic non-alignment. It retains and calls upon US involvement in security concerns, but also capitalises on economic opportunities offered when strengthening market ties with China. In this way, states can preserve strategic ambiguity, cultivate modest self-protection, and can maximise benefits reaped by aligning themselves with the power most dominant at any given time.

Thus, Southeast Asian governments can hedge against external intervention and manipulation, informing a mindset that makes them intrinsically wary of both the US and China. It is important for both powers to understand the deep and abiding twin sentiments of independence and neutralism embedded in the identities of Southeast Asian societies. Ultimately, it is highly unlikely that any country in Southeast Asia will accept an exclusive relationship with either China or the US (or any power).

What will the region look like in relation to Sino-American rivalry?

The Sino-American dynamic is not viewed by many Southeast Asian states as a zero-sum competition, in contrast to the Cold-War era US-Soviet relationship. If the competition between the two powers is not zero-sum, there may be a possibility of “competitive coexistence”, whereby both Beijing and Washington advance their interests in the region, but do not orient their regional policies to directly counter the other in a way that would lead to conflict. Managing the Sino-American competition to ensure peaceful coexistence, as opposed to the adversarial polarisation of the region, which could possibly manifest into war, will be the principal challenge for both powers and Southeast Asian states in the years to come.