On 6 December, the electoral center of Vargas, Venezuela was unrecognisably empty in the midst of a national election wherein Venezuelans were choosing the representatives sitting in the National Assembly. This was a striking image compared to turnout in the 2015 parliamentary elections, where lines extended far beyond the election center entrance and turnout totalled 74%. This year, lines for gas were reportedly longer than those for voting—according to Reuters, only 31% of eligible voters cast their vote. Despite the silence that characterized voting centers, when the National Electoral Council (CNE) declared a victory in favor of the United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV) that backs President Nicolás Maduro, the dictator triumphantly declared it as a recuperation of the Bolivarian Revolution. Maduro claims that the self-proclaimed interim President Juan Guaidó and his supporters had been holding the Assembly hostage since 2015. 

The election was admittedly a one-man show since the incumbent and the opposition were caught in deadlock over discussions concerning the delay of the December elections. When Maduro refused to delay until next year, claiming it would violate the constitution, the opposition boycotted the election. The boycott stemmed from the fact that the absence of an extension inhibited EU observers from having sufficient time to prepare for the event. The National Assembly election was therefore a death foretold of democracy in Venezuela. The CNE is effectively controlled by Maduro and the Organisation of American States passed a resolution on 21 October declaring the election fraudulent. Even if the opposition had chosen to participate, Maduro would have inevitably taken control. The last remaining democratic bastion in Venezuela has fallen into the hands of the dictatorship. 

Whilst it was self-evident that the National Assembly would return to Maduro’s control even before 6 December, the implications are serious and place the international community in a Sisyphean position. Guaidó was recognized as the interim president of Venezuela by the U.S, the EU, and the Lima Group for two overarching reasons: firstly, he had a legitimate constitutional claim to the interim presidency because he was the speaker of the National Assembly, and secondly, there was hope that he embodied tangible democratic change in Venezuela. With the transition period of the National Assembly coming to an end on 5 January, Guaidó will no longer have a legitimate claim to the interim presidency. Though there is nothing necessarily stopping the international community from continuing to recognize Guaidó as the champion of the opposition given how many countries have declared the elections as fraudulent— with the exception of Russia, Cuba, Turkey, Iran and China—the elections certainly incite a reflection on Guaidó’s achievements thus far. 

As a direct reaction to the elections, Guaidó organized a Consulta Popular or Popular Consultation, wherein Venezuelans based nationally and abroad could answer a three-question survey asking respondents about the rejection of 6 December, the recuperation of Venezuelan democracy, and the condemnation of crimes against humanity. With 87% of responses reviewed, the opposition said just under 6.5 million people participated, thus surpassing the turnout of the National Assembly Election. The results of the Consulta Popular have been applauded by the United States, with U.S Ambassador to Venezuela James Story saying the result is a clear sign “democracy must return to Venezuela” and the Consultation has “killed Maduro’s fraud”. Colombia echoed the message, reiterating its recognition of the pre-election National Assembly and Guaidó as interim president. 

Whilst the aforementioned support for the Consultation indicates some support for the Venezuelan opposition, the silence of the Lima Group and the International Contact Group (ICG) in echoing their support for the consultation is deafening. After all, a recognition of the 6 December fraud cannot be automatically equated with support for Guaidó. The lack of a response can be interpreted as a careful calculation of the prospect for democratic change in Venezuela; Guaidó has failed to bring about any significant progress in Venezuela, both at the institutional and grassroots level. In March 2017, the Supreme Court—filled with Maduro loyalists—stripped the National Assembly of its powers, meaning no substantial legislation was passed under Guaidó’s tenure. On 30 April 2019, Guaidó failed to incite an uprising when the military refused to accept his promises of amnesty in a post-Maduro Venezuela. 

Unsurprisingly, the opposition is beginning to fracture under scrutiny and criticism of Guaidó’s leadership. Henrique Capriles, a two-time presidential candidate in Venezuela, has openly voiced that “the opposition today does not have a leader”. Vanessa Neumann, Guadió’s diplomatic envoy to the UK, resigned in the beginning of December due to concerns over the strategy and future of the Guaidó-led opposition. One of Guaidó’s right hand men, Leopoldo López, is living in exile in Spain. To make matters worse, a recent survey conducted in Venezuela indicated that 62% of Venezuelans are backing neither Guaidó nor Maduro. Political indifference reigns, where the most pressing concern of citizens is accessing food, medicine, and electricity. With this dire forecast of the opposition in conjunction with an increasingly empowered incumbency, it is only natural that the international community is wavering in its support for the former interim president. 

These sombre conditions make a democratic transition difficult to believe in. A number of potential watershed moments keep on appearing—Guaidó’s initial democratic recognition, namely—but none of them translate into a change of government in the Miraflores Palace. Why should this time be any different? Now that Guaidó has lost all remaining institutional control, a promise of amnesty to military generals and officers is even less legitimate. Despite the dysfunctionality of the state-owned petroleum company, PDVSA, Maduro’s regime keeps itself afloat with gold, the help of its international allies, and alleged drug trafficking money. 

Perhaps the question, therefore, is not whether the outright fraud will increase pressure for a democratic change, but instead whether it will lead to a change within the opposition itself. Fresh leadership and vision might be precisely what the opposition needs to reconfigure and reconstruct itself, particularly now that the international community is questioning Guaidó’s ability to fill the shoes of the interim presidency. Most importantly, new, charismatic leadership is imperative for reinstituting an interest in politics amongst citizens and trust from the international community. The most important reaction from the opposition will not be a renewed push for democratic change that will undoubtedly fizzle out once again, but, rather, a retrospective project to reconstruct itself and recuperate energy for the Herculean task that awaits it: deposing a deeply entrenched dictatorship that shows no signs of crumbling any time soon.