At the 2003 summit of Thessaloniki, the six Western Balkan countries – Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, North Macedonia (then called the Former Yugoslavian Republic of Macedonia), Montenegro, Serbia, and Kosovo – entered the waiting room for EU accession. Nearly two decades later, they’re still waiting. A recent setback for the southeastern enlargement of the EU was the French veto for opening accession talks last year, whilst Bulgaria is still blocking North Macedonia’s bid to enter the EU. The void that Europe’s seemingly empty promises of accession have left is increasingly being filled by China and Russia, which are investing heavily in transport and energy infrastructure in the region, harnessing ties with local companies and businesses, and influencing the weak media system in the region. The COVID-19 crisis further revealed the political conflicts that have long been smouldering under the surface. Russia and China were quick to provide medical aid in the region, which local leaders like Serbian president Aleksandar Vučić used as an opportunity to denounce EU solidarity as a “fairy tale” and publicly thank “Brother Xi” for his support in the medical crisis.

This situation renders the Western Balkan region one of the most complex challenges of European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen’s “geopolitical commission” in the region. A potential southeastern enlargement of the EU may very well prove to be a watershed moment in the history of European integration: the Union may be forced to choose between geopolitical ambition and its normative basis.

The EU faces a fundamental dilemma when it comes to the Western Balkans. Accession is the only sustainable way of curbing the influence of ambitious great powers in the region and creating stability in the Union’s neighbourhood. Many member states will be reluctant, however, to integrate impoverished net recipients of EU funds, especially now that net EU budget contributor Great Britain is leaving. For instance, the median household income in the EU in 2018 was more than six times higher than that of North Macedonia. There is also a widespread belief in the EU that the accession of Romania and Bulgaria in 2007 was premature and many European leaders do not want to repeat the same mistake. Though the EU is concerned about the growing influence of potentially hostile powers like China and Russia in the region, it does not want to undermine the cohesion of the Union from within. This is especially true at a time when the rift between Eastern and Western member states is growing.

A potential way out of this dilemma would be a reformed accession process, which the French president Emmanuel Macron unveiled last year. The French proposal entails a seven-stage process “in order to effectively converge towards European norms and standards over the long term” and includes a reversibility clause. This would enable the EU to stop accession talks as soon as a single member state no longer wishes to proceed in the proposed direction. The plan aligns with a proposal from the former Director General of Enlargement at the European Commission, Pierre Mirel, who has pleaded for a similar agreement with the Western Balkans. Mirel also imagines a prolonged observation period in which potential member states would not have full access to structural funds of the EU and would not enjoy full voting rights within the EU institutions. This period would include strict monitoring, while “any shortfalls would be sanctioned financially”.

For the EU, the reformed accession process could square the circle. It could curtail the influence of foreign competitors like China and Russia and restrict financial and political participation of the Western Balkan countries. For the potential accessors, on the other hand, it would just mean an institutionalisation of the waiting room they’ve found themselves in since 2003. The reversible accession process with its strong emphasis on prolonged observation and monitoring would place the Western Balkans in an EU-limbo from which they will not escape in the short term. This limbo, while achieving the EU’s geopolitical aims, would undermine the Union’s normative foundation of democracy and equality among member states.

Still, most of the Western Balkan states would probably agree to the reformed accession process, because they know—in spite of their frequent anti-EU statements—that membership in the European Union is their only route to political stability and economic prosperity in the long run. The decision lies with the EU. Europe has to know for itself if it really wants to become a geopolitical player, or if it prefers to remain a “normative power” that values unambiguously its core principles of democracy, freedom and equality. How the EU deals with the accession of Western Balkan countries will provide a first indication of the future trajectory of European foreign policy in general.