Author: Will Butterworth, Frequent Contributor

If you were to read the news or listen to politicians talk about Brexit today, you would be forgiven for hearing only one narrative. That narrative being that the only reason people voted to leave the EU was immigration, and that the rise in anti-EU feeling had to do with the rise of populism in modern politics. This article seeks to dispel both these conclusions as largely untrue.

People have seemingly forgotten that Britain has always been sceptical of European integration.

It started off with Britain refusing to take part in the birth of the European project, when the European Coal and Steel Community was proposed by the French in 1950. Britain back then did not see itself as part of Europe, but as a country that was more global and sought to strengthen its links with the USA and the Commonwealth instead. Churchill famously said he wanted the creation of a ‘United States of Europe’, but he did not want Britain to be a part of it. Back then, Britain saw Europe as a ‘them and us’ situation, and I believe it has retained that opinion largely since.

Even when Britain eventually joined what was then the European Economic Community in 1973, its accession was complicated. Harold Wilson’s Labour government came to power in 1974 having pledged to hold a referendum on Britain’s membership. They held that referendum in 1975. The debate then was remarkably similar to what it was this year, with the fear of the EU infringing on Britain’s sovereignty taking centre stage. Hugh Gaitskell, the former leader of the Labour Party, said that joining a federal Europe would be ‘the end of Britain as an independent European state, the end of a thousand years of history’. Another connection the two referendums has is that due to divisions in the cabinet, ministers were allowed to campaign as they wished in both referendums. What this shows is that the sentiment that British laws should be made in Britain is not a phenomenon of 2016, but a long established criticism of the EU amongst British people.

The referendum of 1975 did not quell Eurosceptic feelings in Britain. They continued to be aired such as in Thatcher’s Bruges Speech in 1988, and when backbench Eurosceptics continually undermined Major’s premiership. Even Blair’s Labour government, who were largely pro-Europe, rejected calls to join the Euro.

There are many more examples of British Euroscepticism. The UK has the most opt-outs out of any EU country (along with Denmark). They include not participating in both the Eurozone and the Schengen Agreement. Eurobarometer surveys which have been carried out by the European Commission have consistently shown the UK to be one of the most Eurosceptic countries in the EU. In 2009, when asked if the EU benefited their country, only 30% of respondents in Britain said it did, compared to 56% in the rest of the EU.

What this shows is that Eurosceptic feelings in the UK did not appear overnight: the UK has always been an odd one out in Europe.

The narrative that the working class in traditional Labour heartlands were the ones that voted to leave in order to curb immigration isn’t true either. Only 37% of Labour voters voted to leave, in contrast to 58% of Conservative voters. In addition, when polled, most Leave voters did not say immigration was their primary concern: 49% said the main reason they voted Leave was because they believed decisions that affect the UK should be made in the UK. Immigration was the number one issue for only 33% of Leave voters, not the 100% many people like you to believe. If you are watching the news or listening to the politicians however, you would be forgiven for thinking immigration was the only issue.

Overall, Brexit should not be seen as an overnight populist uprising in response to mass immigration. In contrast, it was a culmination of anti-EU sentiment that has existed in British politics since the start of the European integration process. The narrative surrounding Brexit has been wrong and I think you would be wise to look through it.