According to the International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), 3.3 billion people live in areas highly exposed to the impacts of climate change. In addition, the Global Internal Displacement Database estimated that in 2022 over 32 million people were forcibly displaced due to environmental phenomena. These figures are expected to rise alongside the frequency and intensity of extreme weather events induced by climate change. Some projections suggest that environmental factors will be responsible for the displacement of approximately 200 million people by 2050. The Middle East and Sub-Saharan Africa, among the most affected areas, currently make up over 40% of asylum-seeker flows into Europe, meaning that the increasing figures arising from climate change impacts will inevitably also affect the EU. Furthermore, although evidence on environmental migration so far have demonstrated that the related movements are mainly short-term and within-borders, the severity and irreversibility of events like floods, droughts and rising sea levels are reshaping migration patterns to be more permanent and long-term. As such, environmental migration is swiftly shifting from an adaptation strategy during specific seasons throughout the year to an increasingly necessary choice among many vulnerable communities.

In this context, not only is protecting those most affected a matter of international responsibility but it is also the only possible solution for handling future migration flows. Nevertheless, as of today, there are no legal instruments formally aimed at migrants who cross borders for environmental reasons. As soon as displaced persons cross an international border, their status becomes uncertain. It has often been argued that since climate change is not typically the only push factor in migration patterns, it can be difficult to include it within a legal framework. The blurred interplay between multiple migration drivers, including environmental phenomena, food security and conflict, means that providing compelling evidence for climate change as the primary culprit behind these flows can be challenging. However, actual trends do not support the argument that it is too hard to identify climate change as the main cause of forced emigration. As stressed by the UN Special Rapporteur in April 2023, currently available scientific tools confirm that isolating the phenomena to understand whether individuals come from areas hit by the effects of climate change is possible. One striking example of a migration crisis stemming from the impact of climate change is the one taking place in Somalia, where the number of displaced people had reached 3.8 million by the end of 2022. Despite having contributed less than 0,003% of global emissions, the country is disproportionally experiencing the consequences. Since 2021, it  has been hit by one of the worst droughts ever recorded, leading to dwindling resources and uninhabitable land characterised by sterile soil and the spreading of waterborne diseases. The crisis is further exacerbated by the rising global price of food resulting from the war in Ukraine, which has left several vulnerable households with no choice but to migrate. 

As of today, there are no international legal instruments addressing climate-induced migration. At the EU level, the European Parliament and the European Commission have both acknowledged the direct link between climate change and migration. In its 2015 European Agenda on Migration, the European Commission explicitly refers to climate change as one of the root causes of migration and displacement. This recognition has been reiterated in the context of the 2019 European Green Deal where climate change has been mentioned as one trigger which is deemed to fuel future migration flows. The European Parliament has also been exploring the concept of “climate refugees” since the 1990s, having commissioned several studies on the subject. Nevertheless, opposition to the creation of a new category of climate refugees among EU Member States has resulted in the persistence of this legislative gap. Most scholars and advocacy groups emphasise that the definition of refugee under the 1951 Refugee Convention is clear and sets out specific limitations. Among the key traits defining refugees, as mentioned in the Convention, is a “well-founded fear of being persecuted” and cross-border movements. Although there is evidence of an overall increasing trend of border crossings among environmental migrants, the characteristics of climate-induced migration would make it problematic for displaced people to fit into this definition. Furthermore, in light of the ongoing backlog of asylum applications in most EU countries, increasing the pressure on the asylum system by adding new classifications may not be desirable.  

Consequently, this standoff among EU Institutions and Member States is yet to be resolved, with both having adopted different approaches to address environmental displacement. The most common measures entail the deployment of  humanitarian and development aid to directly tackle the root causes of migration in origin countries and reduce the necessity to migrate by, for instance, building resilience to environmental hazards. One of the most representative examples is the EU Trust Fund for Africa established in 2016 as an emergency response instrument following the 2015 “migration crisis”. In April 2022, the EU pledged an additional EUR 633 million to be deployed through this instrument to support the populations in East Africa to cope with the dire impact of climate change. Nevertheless, while the goals of the Trust Fund are broadly related to addressing the root causes of migration through the implementation of development programmes, specific projects focused on climate change adaptation and mitigation have been few in number. Furthermore, as stressed by the research and advocacy organisation Climate Refugee, exclusively relying on humanitarian aid to address displacement risks creating what the IPCC Sixth Assessment Report defined as a “climate trap”. The term refers to a situation when those most vulnerable to the impacts of extreme weather events become immobile or are resettled in areas under similar environmental conditions and become highly dependent on humanitarian aid. 

As contended by the European Parliament, other normative tools can be adapted to provide legal protection to those forced to flee. The EU has already set out complementary policies to extend protection to those ineligible for asylum. The Qualification Directive, introducing subsidiary protection, builds on the Geneva Convention and extends protection to those whose conditions do not fall under the Convention scope. In this sense, the Directive is one example of European legislation that, as argued by some scholars, could be amended to include environmental grounds to grant protection to displaced persons. Europe’s policy-making process in the migratory sphere is still ongoing and the provision of better standards for people affected by climate change should be taken into account. Despite this, domestic political trends seem to be heading in the opposite direction, with some national governments trying to cut down on complementary forms of protection. One example can be found in the recent modifications introduced by the Italian government to the special protection instrument aimed to limit its application. Before the so called “Cutro Decree” of 10th March 2023, named after the town in southern Italy where on the 25th of February 2023 over 94 migrants lost their lives in a shipwreck, those who did not qualify for asylum or subsidiary protection could still receive a residency permit based on private and family ties. However, despite family rights being formally protected under the Constitution, they no longer provide grounds for migrant protection. 

This is just one example casting doubt on the idea that national governments will unilaterally decide to take responsibility and recognize a new category of environmental migrants. The political emphasis attached to the migration discourse at a national level makes a European approach to the problem even more urgent. Thus, the formal acknowledgement of climate-induced migration would be crucial not only for extending legal protection to those affected but also to ensure a stronger commitment of the international community to climate change.