The tremors of Sudan’s October coup d’etat were already felt earlier in 2021. The approaching calamity of the event had informed its coming in the form of the pro-military protest on September 21, 2021, while the increasing civilian-military dispute in the government had started to ring alarm bells soon after the removal of Sudanese President Omar Al-Bashir on April 11, 2019. Since then, Sudan has been submerged in a clamorous situation, and the resignation of Abdalla Hamdok on January 2, 2022,  has only compounded the country’s strife.

The ouster of Sudan’s long-serving President (1989-2019), Al-Bashir, in 2019, saw the emergence of a power-sharing pact between the military and the civilian-led cabinet. Under the agreement, Sudanese military general Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan was to hand over the chairmanship of the Sovereign Council, an eleven-member governing body that was part of the transitional government, to a civilian member on November 17, 2021, ensuring reduced army involvement in post-transition government and security structures. The impending deadline impelled the General to act well in time to protect the military’s stakes in Sudan’s government, and so he did – a state of emergency was declared, the military took over the government, Hamdok and other ministers were arrested, and the rags of democratic transition were further rent.  

Sudan’s history is replete with coups d’etats and military dominance; since achieving independence in 1956, the country has experienced around 35 coups (including successful/unsuccessful/attempted coups and alleged plots). This traditional hegemony of men with guns can be traced back to British colonial rule. Before independence, Sudan was under the governance of an Anglo-Egyptian condominium (1899-1956). The historic bifurcation of territory between Britain and Egypt gave way to the emergence of an Arab Islamic north and a Black Christian south. However, post-independence, several Khartoum-based governments pursued a policy of Arabization and Islamization, which led to civil conflict. Notably, Sudan’s two major civil wars, in 1955 and 1983, braced militias and solidified citizens’ dependence on men with guns.

The Sudanese authorities counteracted southern militias with their own militant groups. These militias were funded and given significant authority in their regions and an ad hoc militia system eventually formalized over time. Fast forward to recent times, Janjaweed – an Arab militia, part of the paramilitary group Rapid Support Forces (RSF), headed by the infamous Lieutenant Muhammad Hamdan Dagalo, otherwise known as Hemedti  – assumed a leading role in committing atrocities for the military in the Darfur conflict (2003). It was the integration of these militias with the Sudanese forces that helped shape Sudan’s current political terrain. 

To further consolidate power, Sudan’s men with guns worked to turn the country into a kleptocracy, especially under Al-Bashir. The administrative and economic institutions as well as certain key sectors, like gold, gum arabic, flour, the sesame industry, and meat exports, are today all controlled by the army and security forces through a network of around 250 companies. These companies enjoy tax exemptions and work under total opacity that protects them from checks and balances. Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the RSF have acquired significant commercial interests in the form of private front companies and extensive black market activities. These forces are in control of Sudan’s eastern ports and valuable markets, including fuel, wheat, and medicine. By ensuring command over the muscle and the market, these forces have secured domination in Sudan’s current political landscape.

After Al-Bashir’s ouster in 2019, there was some hope among the Sudanese as well as pro-democracy international onlookers to limit the control of the military as Sudan moved towards democratic transition. This promise of democratic transition might have emboldened Hamdok to denounce “military and/or security forces’ unacceptable investment in productive sectors.” He tried to judder the 52-year-long control of Sudan by men with guns, and so, they responded with a putsch.

The end of last year witnessed another deal and a renewed “civilian-military partnership.” General Al-Burhan was successful in bringing Hamdok to sign the November 21 deal that reestablished the civilian-military alliance under Al-Burhan’s control. The west and the rest of the world were happy to have Hamdok back, who for them represented the resurrection of the so-called democratic transition. But in the eyes of several pro-democracy groups, Hamdok had “failed the revolution.” Many from the Forces of Freedom and Change and other democratic parties refused to acknowledge the agreement. This opposition hurdled Hamdok, who resigned on January 2, 2022, disintegrating yet another deal.

Hamdok’s resignation could shift the tide in the favor of pro-democracy groups. Up until now, Al-Burhan and his deputy, Hemedti, have used militias and intelligence to their advantage, and have had it their way. This emboldened them to make hypocritical self-proclamations as defenders of the revolution. Al-Burhan’s position protects the prevalent authoritarianism in a region that is plunged in turmoil. The persistence of military domination is more suitable to the regional actors than the establishment of a democracy – Egyptian President Abdel Fatah Al-Sisi sees Al-Burhan as an ally in the controversial matter of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam. In short, Al-Burhan seemed to be winning, and Hamdok’s resignation may have put things a little off order.

The military is in a precarious position in the absence of the delusive power-sharing deal. With its cover gone, it is again open to international criticism. The so-called Troika – US, UK, Norway, and the EU, made it clear that they would not accept a new Sudanese prime minister if the civilian members are not involved in the appointment process. The United Nation’s envoy to Sudan, Volker Perthes, also made a statement signalling UN efforts to engage other stakeholder parties, including Sudan’s civil societies, resistance groups, and other civilian factions, to initiate dialogue between the civilian and military actors. 

While there are  worries concerning complete military domination and the exclusion of civilian involvement, the situation may not be particularly favorable for General Al-Burhan. After South Sudan achieved independence in 2011, Sudan lost around 75% of its oil reserves, putting the economy in a fragile state. Political instability had subjected Sudan to sanctions for a long time and the current coup impedes the chances of getting much needed aid from the US (~$700m) and the World Bank. Sudan’s financial precarity and international checks may have managed to hold the military in place.

Even so, there is an air of uncertainty around how the events might unfold in the near future. With limited jubilation from key civilian groups over UN-facilitated talks, it is a matter of time to evaluate how successful the UN and western powers will be in starting negotiations between the military and civilian actors. There is also the question of the stability of the relationship between Al-Burhan’s SAF and Hemedti’s RSF. Will time expose rifts in the alliance of the parties to the coup? And will the persistence and resistance of the Sudanese people once again shake the hold of the men with guns? The elections promising civilian rule are set to be held in 2023. Even if in name only, the path is still promised to lead towards democracy.