Nearly eleven years since the onset of the Syrian Civil War and its ensuing refugee crisis, Turkey is coming to terms with the deep-seated consequences of mass refugee flows across its border and an ‘open-door’ policy that has led it to host over 3.6 million Syrian refugees. The expectations of Turkey’s refugee policy from 2011-15 are a stark contrast to their policy perceptions entering the new decade. The open-door was not merely born out of necessity, but influenced by the promise of various political benefits, including enhancing Turkish soft power, carving a long-term role in post-conflict Syria, and leveraging benefits from the European Union (EU). However, economic strain has accelerated anti-immigrant sentiments across Turkey since 2019, and the sort of exclusionary populism seen across Europe has become increasingly common. The promise of the Justice and Development Party’s (AKP) refugee policy has gradually crumbled, faced with a prolonged Syrian conflict, decaying negotiations with the EU, and a domestic populace increasingly hostile to refugees perceived to have overstayed their welcome. The issues of migration and refugee resettlement now have the power to transform Turkish politics as we approach the 2023 general elections.

The AKP’s refugee policy foresaw an opportunity to promote Turkish soft power through a rhetoric of inclusionary populism interwoven with Neo-Ottomanism. The rhetoric adopted by the AKP in its policy correspondence sought to present Turkey as a global leader and emphasize its “shared common history” with Islamic and formerly Ottoman nations. Inclusionary populism, in particular Islamic solidarity, underlies the AKP’s identity construction under leaders like former Prime Minister Ahmed Davutoğlu, having presented itself as a protector of oppressed majorities (such as Syria’s Sunni majority, ruled by a minority of influential Alawites). The open-door policy communicates this identity and seeks to promote an increased orientation among states towards Turkey in economic and political affairs. Conversely, the open-door reinforces the state-society relationship with the AKP’s domestic audience by projecting domestic narratives of protecting marginalized groups (e.g. protection from elites) to the international sphere. It is thus informative to view the open-door policy as a means to strengthen domestic party identification.

In the words of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the open-door policy has also fostered a normative critique of the “so-called human rights advocate countries” in the West, promoting a perception of Turkey as a moral power on the international stage. The “Turkish model” is presented as a viable alternative to a Western humanitarian model which he has criticized as more rhetoric than real, with Turkey’s embrace of refugees as a case in point. It is a point of pride among domestic voters, as Turkish policy has thrust them to the forefront as a leader in the international sphere. 

In real terms, Turkey’s open door provided a means to influence the post-conflict power structure in Syria from an early vantage point where prolonged conflict seemed unlikely, and the collapse of the Assad regime was broadly anticipated. The incorporation of Syrian refugees into Turkish foreign policy would both legitimize and reinforce Turkish involvement in the conflict as a mediator and vested power. Turkey’s long term vision sought to establish a conciliatory power on its borders; a Sunni ally, hedging Turkish foreign policy and enabling power projection into the Mediterranean and Middle East. Once a friendly regime had been established, Syrian refugees could return to their homeland.

The reality on the ground has forced Turkey to reconsider this expectation. A peaceful resolution to the Syrian conflict proves elusive, and the entrance of powers such as Russia has greatly complicated the prospects of a Turkish-led peace settlement. Operation Euphrates Shield elucidates the Turkish policy shift, which involves increasingly abandoning efforts to influence conflict resolution in favor of more pragmatic programs to resettle refugees in Syrian ‘safe zones’ while regionalizing the ‘Kurdish question’.

Given the inescapable reality of irregular migration from Syria and the centrality of the refugee question to European politicians, the open-door also provided Turkey an opportunity to extract political benefits from the EU. The 2015 EU-Turkey joint action plan stipulated the return of Syrian refugees entering Europe to Turkey, with European commitments to adopt one refugee for each returned to Turkey and the provision of up to 6 billion euros in financial aid. More importantly, accession talks for Turkey to join the EU would be revitalized and discussions for Turkish visa liberalization were to be held. Refugees thus acted as a tool of leverage over the EU, primarily as a method to share the costs of Turkey’s growing refugee population, as well as to promote stagnant discussions on furthering the EU-Turkey relationship to realize economic benefits and the “de-securitisation” of Turkish foreign policy.

Over six years later, the conflict endures and polling data suggests a majority of Turkey’s Syrian refugees see Turkey as their new home: 51.8% wouldn’t return to Syria under any circumstances as of 2019. Visa liberalization for Turks has failed to materialize, and accession to the EU is an extremely distant if not futile prospect. While Turkey has received the promised financial aid, it must now reconcile a massive refugee population which now calls Turkey home, with a domestic population increasingly hostile to their presence. It is abundantly clear that a restructuring of the Turkey-EU deal is necessary, one encompassing a “multi-annual framework” to equitably share the burden of hosting refugees and structure yearly aid rather than one-off payments.

The refugee situation has occupied center stage in Turkish politics, exacerbated by economic woes since 2018 in the form of a currency crisis and rampant inflation. As witnessed in other host nations, refugees have become an effective scapegoat for a faltering economy and opposition parties have seized the opportunity for political leverage. Turkey’s primary opposition group, the People’s Republican Party (CHP), have increasingly espoused an anti-refugee, exclusionary platform including depictions of refugees as “Turkey’s number-one national survival problem”. Their 2019 victory in Istanbul’s mayoral election, an AKP stronghold for the past 25 years, should ring alarm bells for the ruling party approaching the 2023 general elections, especially as opinion polls indicate 70% of Turkish respondents would favor political parties “promis(ing) the toughest action”.

While a resolution to the Syrian conflict remains distant, political support for refugees has become increasingly untenable. Meanwhile, approaching elections are raising the political pressure in favour of exclusionary policies. Some opinion polls indicate that Erdoğan and the AKP are becoming increasingly unpopular in favor of the CHP and allied parties, who have articulated a comparatively hostile policy towards refugees. Soaring inflation and an all-time low currency has eroded savings and hurt the living conditions of working-class Turks, which may ignite further anti-refugee sentiments. And while violent protests against Syrians remain uncommon, an increasingly hostile political landscape could provoke further violence and discrimination against Syrians on a broader scale. The well-being of millions of refugees in Turkey increasingly rests on the unstable prospects of international coordination, shifting economic tides, and a resolution to Syria’s forever war.